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11. Introduction
The aim of this short Master Thesis is to look at how affective meaning could potentially impact 
grammar. Affective meaning is to be understood as meaning conveying emotional and/or attitudinal
content, determining whether a semantic unit is seen as affectively positive or negative. Grammar 
could be said to be given a broad (and perhaps somewhat unconventional) definition, corresponding
to the view presented by (e.g.) Langacker (2008); that grammar is meaningful. From a cognitive 
perspective, such as Langacker's, the meaningfulness of grammar is simply a consequence of an 
understanding of language as “an integral facet of cognition” (Langacker 2008: 8), reflecting the 
human perceptual apparatus, or mind. Hence, from such a holistic perspective, affect should 
reasonably have an impact on language, and grammar.
By means of corpus analysis, analysing transcripts of real world conversations provided in 
the Corpus of Contemporary American English (COCA), information on how affect may impact 
grammar is taken to be obtained. The study itself consists of analysing the use and meaning of the 
synonymous lexical pair infant and baby, taken to differ principally in terms of affective meaning. 
The analysis can be said to be twofold, in that it examines both how infant and baby compare (i.e., 
what their difference consists of), and how affective meaning impacts their use and meaning both 
individually and generally.
The method used in analysing this lexical pair rests on the understanding of the clause as 
fundamental to human linguistic production. Clausal instantiations of both lexical items are 
deconstructed into predicative structures and analysed according to three principal parameters: (1) 
semantic prosody (inferred from lexical meaning); (2) epistemological status; (3) reference type. 
Predicative structures can be said to correspond to simplified first order predicate logic structures, 
in that they identify dependent (corresponding to predicates) and autonomous (arguments of 
predicates) elements and their clausally internal structuring. Semantic prosody is essentially equated
to affective meaning, and is defined as being either positive, negative, or inconspicuous. 
Epistemological status and reference type are both given a binary classification, as being 
extensional or intensional, and specific or non-specific, respectively.
2. Theoretical preliminaries
This section outlines the basic theoretical notions which underpin both the rationale for, as well as, 
the method applied in, this thesis' object of study; the (potential) grammatical effects by affect. 
Section 2.1. provides a succinct description of the theoretical fundamentals concerning the 
2relationship between language, cognition, and affect. In section 2.2., a brief outline of the premises 
on which this thesis' understanding of meaning rests are presented, and in section 2.3. details 
regarding the role of affect in relation to language and meaning are elaborated. Lastly, in section 
2.4., a concise description of the object of analysis, i.e., the use and meaning of the synonymous 
pair infant – baby, and how it relates to the object of study, is given.
2.1. Language, cognition, and the role of affect
The perhaps most elemental theoretical premise of this thesis is the understanding of language as a 
reflection of the human cognitive apparatus. More specifically, linguistic activity is not only 
critically dependent on, but also an integral facet of, cognition (Langacker 2008: 8). Cognition is, in
turn, fundamentally dependent on affect, which allows perceptual input to be cognitively processed 
and made sense of relative to one-self (Duncan & Feldman Barrett 2007: 1196). There is, simply 
put, no clear boundary between language and other psychological, or cognitive, phenomena, which 
language often gives expression to.
Cognition is seen as being physiologically grounded in perception, or what Barsalou (1999) 
calls perceptual symbol systems. This means that cognition is grounded in analogical and 
multimodal symbol systems. They are multimodal because they originate in all modes of 
experience, including both the, so to speak, traditional senses, such as, vision, olfaction, gustation, 
etc., as well as, for example, proprioception, and introspection (585). For this reason, they are also 
analogical, since the representation of a symbol (at least to some degree) intrinsically corresponds 
to the perceptual state which gave rise to it (578).
The role of affect is taken to be foundational for cognition, not only being intrinsic, but in 
fact constitutive, to cognitive processing. “[A]ffect is an intrinsic property in all psychological 
phenomena that result from so-called ‘cognitive’ processes (such as consciousness, language, and 
memory)” (Duncan & Feldman Barrett 2007: 1201). Among other things, this means that the 
distinction often made between thinking and feeling is phenomenological, and not ontological. That 
is, the perceived difference between that which is understood as factual, as opposed to emotional, 
experience is in fact a phenomenological difference physiologically contingent on the role affect has
on the processing of that experience. Studying the relation between affect and cognition, Duncan & 
Feldman Barrett furthermore suggest that affect is what “provides individuals with the subjective 
sense of certainty [sic] comes with consciously seeing an object” (1197). In other words, affect is 
what allows sensory, or perceptual, input to be consciously grounded in a person, establishing the 
subjective, personally relevant, relation between the person perceiving and the thing (entity) 
3perceived.
As for language, “[i]n humans, linguistic symbols develop together with their associated 
perceptual symbols” (Barsalou 1999: 592), meaning that, for example, a word in itself could be said
to become the very concept it labels. “Through language, humans became able to control 
[conceptualisations] in the minds of others, including [conceptualisations] of mental states” (607). 
In other words, (the meaning of) a linguistic expression is physiologically experienced, i.e. 
materialised, in the sensory regions linked to its conceptualisation. In this way, linguistic 
expressions could be seen as the objectification of the subjective structuring of experience, 
providing a socially accessible external dimension of tangibility to the human (physiologically 
internal) cognitive system.
2.2. A concise outline of meaning
This section aims at providing a concise description of three basic premises concerning meaning 
which underlie both section 2.3. on affective meaning, and section 3. describing the method applied 
in studying potential grammatical effects of affect: (1) the meaning of a meaningful unit 
corresponds to the abstracted sum of the meaningful unit's expressionally combinatory totality 
(potential); (2) grammar is meaningful (Langacker 2008: 3), or more precisely, grammar 
corresponds to meaning-creative structuring of meaningful units; (3) the clause is the basic 
meaning-creative structure (and/or unit).
Understanding meaning as a not exclusively lexical matter is today perhaps commonplace, 
much owing to Sinclair's work in corpus linguistics pointing to meaning as typically being realised 
in units of meaning, as lexical items (e.g., Sinclair 2004a; 2004b). That is, although (senses of) 
words possess discrete meanings in themselves, syntagmatic co-ordination of words (i.e., grammar)
plays an absolutely crucial role in the creation of meaning; “meaning arises from words in particular
combinations” (2004b: 148). Similarly, Stubbs (2001: 120) claims that “[s]emantic units stretch 
well beyond words and short phrases”, arguing that meaning creation is greatly determined by 
syntagmatic organisation, and fundamentally rejecting the notion of meaning as independent from 
syntax (119). In essence, meaning would, hence, be the product of syntactic configuration of the 
semantic discreteness of words, a semantic discreteness (i.e., meaning) which exists in and through 
lexical patterns, or conventionalised expressions. The perceived discrete meaning of a word could 
thus largely be thought of as an abstracted coherent sum of its expressionally combinatory totality, 
or rather, potential, completely contingent on the expressions in which it conventionally is 
instantiated.
4Grammar could thus be thought of as the means by which linguistic units are combined and 
made meaningful (i.e., useful). In other words, grammar can be said to be meaning-creative, 
providing the principles for how to structure and use linguistic expressions. In fact, grammar could, 
in a manner of speaking, be said to be zoomed out (lexical) meaning. Grammar and lexicon (the set 
of conventionalised expressions in a language1) form a continuum of (assemblies of) symbolic 
structures, a continuum in which grammar corresponds to the semantically schematic range, and 
lexicon to the semantically specific one (Langacker 2008: 20; 161). By and large, grammar could, 
hence, be thought of as the blueprint for linguistic materialisation of knowledge, or as the 
“conventionally established patterns for putting together symbolic assemblies [i.e., meaningful 
units]” (168).
Linguistically, meaning-creative processes can archetypically be said to structurally 
correspond to clauses. In fact, the clause could effectively be thought of as the structural means of 
translating knowledge into discrete linguistic (i.e. meaningful) units, making clauses “our basic 
vehicle for talking about the world and relating occurrences to our own circumstances” (Langacker 
2008: 354). That is, through clausal structuring we are able to express how entities in the world 
around us relate to one another. Clauses allow for the symbolic representations of such entities (i.e., 
words, phrases, and the like) to relate to one another in such ways that propositions are formed, 
typically predicating something of someone. By means of predication properties are attributed to 
entities, consequently resulting in a reciprocal (property - entity) meaning-creative process2. The 
clause, hence, assumes a pivotal function not only with respect to communication per se (translating
knowledge into linguistic content), but in creating meaning, providing its constructional premise.
2.3. A basic outline of affective meaning
Expressive, or affective, meaning is typically understood as dealing with those aspects of meaning 
which convey emotional, or attitudinal, content (Cruse 1986: 274; Leech 1981: 15; Lyons 1995: 
44). As such, it is contrasted to what is variably referred to as descriptive, conceptual, or (perhaps 
most commonly) propositional meaning. Whereas propositional meaning is taken to reflect facts of 
the objective world (existing independently of our human selves), expressive meaning instead 
1 This set, thus, comprises all expressions which can be said to be fixed, or conventionalised (Langacker 2008: 16), 
corresponding to a (relative to a more traditional characterisation of lexicon as the set of words in a language) 
multitude of different types of expressions, such as words, phrases, clauses, and full-fledged clichés, idioms, and 
proverbs.
2 Very briefly, by predicating P of a both P and a can be thought of as undergoing a meaning-creative process, since 
perceptual symbols (and their associated linguistic symbols) are dynamic and componential, not discrete, rigid, nor 
holistic (Barsalou 1999: 584). Hence, the intension and extension of an expression are not only interdefinable 
(Dowty, Wall & Peters 1981: 149), but also reciprocally influential.
5reflects an opinion, or stance, of an individual (or group of individuals) towards some property of 
the (objective) world.
Throughout this thesis, expressive meaning is interchangeably referred to as affective 
meaning. The two terms taken to be synonymous, affective is preferred due to its, relative to 
expressive, unequivocal semantic character. Affect is to be understood principally as a conceptually 
superordinate category, encompassing those conceptual properties which cognitively ground 
complex conceptual constructs such as emotion, attitude, and evaluation. In Langackeresque 
terminology, affect could thus be considered a basic cognitive domain, or realm of experience, 
comparable in its conceptual irreducibility to, e.g., time, space, or any of the senses, such as 
olfaction (Langacker 2008: 44-45). Emotion (or feelings), attitude, and evaluation would, hence, be 
considered non-basic cognitive domains, meaning that they are conceptually complex, or elaborate, 
involving additional conceptual (perceptual) information. Duncan & Feldman Barrett (2007), 
studying the relation which holds between affect and cognition, liken affect (or core affect) to “a 
neurophysiologic barometer of [an] individual’s relationship to an environment at a given point in 
time”; a barometer measuring two psychological properties: hedonic valence (in terms of pleasure –
displeasure) and arousal (activation – sleepy) (1185-1186)3. In this way, (self-reported) feelings 
could be thought of as conceptually contextualised barometer readings (1186), and (core) affect as 
the neuro-physiological essence which constitutes the nucleus of conceptually elaborate feelings, 
such as anger, sadness, joy, etc. (Russell & Feldman Barrett 1999: 806). Similarly, attitude and 
evaluation, being more cognitively (or conceptually4) saturated still, could simplistically be thought 
of as a person's feelings directed towards an entity, the difference between the two residing in their 
respective focus, or lack thereof, on time; attitude being equated to evaluation extended over time 
(815).
In spoken discourse, expressive meaning is perhaps most typically associated with non-
lexical marking, such as tone of voice, or facial gestures5. Yet, even without (such) non-lexical 
marking (as in written discourse) many (most, or even all) lexical items seem to convey some 
aspect of expressive meaning, even if only connotatively (Cruse 1986; Leech 1981; Lyons 1995). 
Given a view on (lexical) meaning as encyclopaedic (see, e.g., Langacker 2008: 39), i.e., as being 
3 In his paper “The expressive dimension” (2007), Potts makes use of the same two-dimensional notion of affect in 
devising what he refers to as expressive indices. In Potts' model, an expressive index fundamentally corresponds to 
an interval; [-1, 1], in which the narrowness of the interval represents the level of arousal, and the the interval's 
polarity (i.e., negative or positive) the orientation of its hedonic valence (177-78).
4 Throughout this thesis, concept can be said to correspond to a static representation of a cognitive process, yet “since 
all conceptions are dynamic (residing in processing activity), there is no sharp boundary between [concepts and 
cognitive abilities]” (Langacker 2008: 34).
5 Note, for example, how also the usage of tone of voice seems to be conventionalised, and how changes to such 
conventionalised uses may produce changes in meaning, such as ironic effects, as when uttering Wow(!) in a 
disengaged, non-emphatic manner.
6emphatically relational6, from which a lexical item's meaning corresponds to a polysemy network 
(37-38) in which different, but related, senses (i.e., uses) of a lexical item are derived from the 
lexical item's expressional totality, the idea that all lexical items are inherently expressive would 
seem to follow quite logically. That is, non-expressive and expressive senses would effectively be 
connected to one another, since all senses of a lexical item can be thought of as constituting a 
network of senses. Therefore, even though words such as the expletive damn and the seemingly 
neutral chair seem to be, so to speak, worlds apart, with regard to their respective expressive 
content (or rather, the centrality of that content), the exemplified contrast would seem to be most 
appropriately understood as that between two opposing ends in an expressive – non-expressive 
continuum inherent to all (senses of) lexical items (475), rather than that of a dichotomy between 
propositional and expressive lexical meaning. In other words, although expressive and propositional
meaning (phenomenologically) differ from one another, the two are intrinsically intertwined.
Analogous to how affect in section 2.1. is described as intrinsic and constitutive to 
cognition, evaluation (i.e., conceptually contextualised affect directed at an entity) would seem 
discursively ubiquitous and symbolically constructive; “It can reasonably be argued that every text 
and every utterance is evaluative, so that the phenomenon itself disappears, to be replaced simply 
by 'language'” (Hunston 2011: 19). That is, the discursive pervasiveness of  evaluation would seem 
not only inherent to linguistic production as such, but fundamentally formative of symbolic entities 
and their meaning. Hunston (1993; 1994; 2000; 2011), approaching evaluation from a text-analytic 
perspective, analysing a variety of genres, both quantitatively and qualitatively, describes it as 
ultimately being a means to present (the conceptual existence of) an entity and ascribe a quality to 
(i.e., conceptual contextualisation of) that entity (2000: 202).
Basically, Hunston's account of evaluation can be seen as quantification of conceptual 
domains central to the ideological structuring of a social (cultural) unit, as the act of evaluating an 
entity corresponds to judging it to several parameters. A parameter could, hence, be said to 
correspond to the structuring of a conventionalised understanding of some aspect of the world 
posited (imposed) by a social unit. Although the evaluative act comprises several parameters, two 
are of particular importance: [Epistemic] status, corresponding to a parameter of certainty, judging a
discursive entity as being, for example, true, false, a belief, or mythical; and value [of desirability], 
along a scale of good – bad, determining how an entity relates to the goals (i.e., what is deemed 
desirable) of the value system of the social construction in which the evaluation occurs. Assigning 
an entity a certain epistemic status could be said to be equivalent to discursively reifying it, 
6 In brief, an encyclopaedic understanding of lexical meaning posits that “a lexical meaning [i.e., sense] resides in a 
particular way of accessing an open ended body of knowledge pertaining to a certain type of entity” (Langacker 
2008: 39).
7bestowing it a discursive status of being, for example, a truth (i.e., existing), or a misconception 
and/or lie (i.e., not existing). As is fairly obvious when semantically considering many epistemic 
statuses, such as, for example, the evaluation of an entity as being true, epistemic status and value 
along a scale of good – bad would seem inextricably linked (1994: 197). That is, that which is true 
is typically (in many social settings) also considered inherently good, whereas that which is false is 
not rarely seen as bad. The evaluation of an entity along different parameters and the subsequent 
interconnection of those parametrical values could, ultimately, be considered the process which 
confers meaning to an entity; i.e., presenting its existence and ascribing a quality to it, possibly 
making evaluation the meaning-creative process par excellence.
According to Thompson & Hunston, “[...] the most basic parameter, the one to which the 
others can be seen to relate, is the good—bad parameter” (2000: 25). Understanding evaluation as 
equivalent to meaning creation, Osgood et al. can be said to have made very much the same claim 
in their ambitious study “The Measurement of Meaning”, already in 1957. Similar to how Hunston 
defines evaluation as multi-parametrical, Osgood et al. characterised meaning, or the semantic 
space (as they called it), as being multidimensional (1957: 71). However, among the different 
dimensions (i.e., parameters) identified by Osgood et al., the one referred to as being attitudinal7 
demonstrated such a preponderance of dimensional correlations (i.e., general semantic ubiquity) 
that Osgood et al. likened it to “a sort of sheath with leaves unfolding toward various other 
directions of the total space” (70). The (essence of the) definition provided by Osgood et al. of this 
attitudinal dimension is, in fact, what is being echoed in the description of affect by Duncan & 
Feldman Barrett (above); “attitudes are implicit processes [of internal mediational activity] having 
reciprocally antagonistic properties and varying in intensity” (Osgood et al. 1957: 190). Just like 
Duncan & Feldman Barrett, Osgood et al. did not only deem the attitudinal, or affective, dimension 
as being intrinsic to all meaning, or concepts (190-91), but effectively principal to cognition as a 
whole; “the attitudinal variable in human thinking, based as it is on the bedrock of rewards and 
punishments both achieved and anticipated, appears to be primary” (72).
Under the heading of “Towards a Modal Grammar of English”, Stubbs (1996) provides a 
functionalist approach to meaning (or grammar; the meaning-creative structuring of meaningful 
units), in many ways very similar to Hunston's description of evaluation (understood as meaning 
creation). Fundamentally, meaning could simplistically be summarised as an intricate composite 
7 The attitudinal dimension is more commonly referred to as the evaluative dimension in Osgood et al.'s study, but the
two are actually taken to be synonymous; “It seems reasonable to to identify attitude, as it is ordinarily conceived in 
both lay and scientific language, with the evaluative dimension of the total semantic space” (1957: 190). In their 
study, the evaluative dimension encompassed multiple (attitudinal) conceptual scales, such as, good-bad, beautiful-
ugly, and pleasant-unpleasant (36).
8comprising semantic content and a stance towards that content (215)8. Such a stance, or 
perspective, which could be equated to Hunston's notion of parametrical evaluation, linguistically 
corresponds to Stubbs' generalised definition of modality9;
“the ways in which language is used to encode meanings such as degree of certainty and 
commitment, or alternatively vagueness and lack of commitment, personal beliefs versus generally
accepted or taken for granted knowledge[, which all together function] to express group 
membership, as speakers adopt positions, express agreement and disagreement with others, make 
personal and social allegiances and contracts” (202). 
According to Stubbs, “the encoding of [modality] is a central organizing principle in language” 
(197), manifest in three kinds of linguistic (i.e., meaningful) units, namely lexical items, 
propositions, and illocutionary forces (203). Modality, thus, serves to present a certain construal of 
a semantic content relative social, or ideological, conventions, and can basically be understood in 
terms of commitment and detachment (211). That is, the denotative applicability of a certain 
linguistic unit, such as propositions like it is P, or it could be P, is ultimately determined by the 
(social) context in which the unit occurs, and markers of commitment and detachment (along 
various types of modality, or parameters) function (simplistically) as mediational devices between 
the (central) semantic content of such linguistic units and the denotational conventions of the social 
context in which the units occur10.
Lyons (1995: 330) can be seen as adding yet another dimension to the notion of modality by 
distinguishing between subjective and objective modality, the difference between the two roughly 
corresponding to the difference between I think that P and Given knowledge K, P. Given an 
understanding of the difference between factuality and emotionality (or thinking and feeling) as 
physiologically contingent on affect (i.e., as being phenomenological, as mentioned in section 2.1.), 
it would seem appropriate to reinterpret subjective and objective modality along the lines of explicit
and implicit (or perhaps direct and indirect) subjective modality, i.e., emphasising the importance of 
understanding all types of construal as being inherently subjective. In this way, by stressing its 
intrinsically and fundamentally subjective nature, understanding modality in terms of commitment –
8 Cf. the notion of meaning as encyclopaedic (above); “[a certain sense] resides in a particular way of accessing an 
open-ended body of knowledge pertaining to a certain type of entity” (Langacker 2008: 39).
9 Cf. Palmer's (1986: 16) general definition of modality; “the grammaticalization of speakers' (subjective) attitudes 
and opinions”.
10 Obviously, this is a grossly simplified account of how meaning relates to social context, not least since meaning, or 
semantic content (i.e., a certain construal of an interconnection of conceptual content), is in itself fundamentally 
determined by the social context, or body, in which it is conceptualised and resides (see, e.g., Taylor 2003: 86). 
Nevertheless, this description chiefly serves to highlight the relation that holds between a (Stubbs') generalised kind 
of modality (as an, as it were, external form of construal) and the semantic content of linguistic units. Perhaps 
Stubbs' account of modality can be thought of as a sort of socially grounded meta-semantic construal; a social 
construal of objective meaning.
9detachment can be thought of as a type of (metaphorical) deixis. That is, modality, or commitment –
detachment, is fundamentally a kind of contextually dependent gestural11 reference (Lyons 1995: 
303), which serves to indicate the relative (metaphorical) distance, or proximity, of an entity to the 
producer of an expression referring to that entity, along parameters, or conceptual domains, such as 
the ones described above. Langacker's notion of grounding (2008), based in the inherent 
subjectivity of reference, could be thought of as a generalised form of deixis subsuming not only the
archetypically deictic spatial, temporal, and personal dimensions, but also the social, or socio-
expressive12, such as the good-bad parameter. Grounding, then, is the manner in which a basic 
connection is established between the ground (roughly composed of the interlocutors and the 
context in which their interaction occurs)13 and the conceptual content evoked by an expression 
(259)14. The basic-ness of such a connection could simplistically be said to refer to elemental types 
of minimal opposition, or contrast, such as marking of tense; present (Ø, -s) vs. past (-ed), spatial 
demonstratives; this vs. that, and socio-expressive value; good vs. bad, which all together can be 
said to provide basic means of discursively referential orientation (263).
Through the (emphatically subjective) notion of grounding, i.e., the generalisation of 
referential relations (whether they be labelled, for example, modal, or deictic), the symbolically 
foundational function of affect may become somewhat more easily comprehended. That is, by 
appreciating that all types of symbolic reference are based in subjectivity, i.e., that they only come 
into existence and become meaningful through the cognitive lens which is oneself, the role of 
affect, as the principal constituent of subjectivity, becomes paramount. In addition, if one takes the 
socio-expressive category of good-bad as a metaphysical extension of the physiological category of 
pain-pleasure (or pleasure-displeasure), then the subjectivity provided by affect could be thought of
as the provision of physical concreteness, or tangibility, both to cognition at large, as well as to 
language (or its various forms of linguistic meaning) in particular. All types of meaning, regardless 
the symbolic dimensions in which they are based, or the conceptual domains to which they connect,
whether they be spatial, temporal, epistemological, socio-expressive, etc., would, thus, 
fundamentally be contingent on physiologically embedded affective notions, such as pain-pleasure, 
in order to be made sense of, i.e., understood relative to oneself. Then, conceiving of the attitudinal, 
or good-bad, dimension as primary to meaning creation would make perfect sense, since affect (or 
its metaphysical extensions; socio-expressive attitude, or evaluation), in fact, in this way could be 
11 Given a metonymic interpretation of gestural as 'physically, or physiologically, indicative'.
12 The term taken from Lyons (1995).
13 The more common term is probably deictic context; the here and now of an utterance. See, e.g., Lyons (1995: 304-
5).
14 Langacker (2008) actually has two parallel definitions of grounding; a broad and a narrow one (see 2008: 262-4). In
this thesis, however, no distinction is made between the two.
10
considered symbolically constitutive; a sheath, or the glue that allows for all conceptual constructs 
to cohere. In fact, through evaluation (i.e., the multi-parametrical contextualisation of conceptual 
entities) affect would seemingly function as that which connects the symbolic with the social, 
constituting the fundamental category of the socio-symbolic, or language.
2.4. The object of analysis: The use and meaning of infant and baby
As already mentioned in the introduction, this thesis' object of study are the (potential) grammatical 
effects of affect. As a means of accessing this object of study, a synonymous pair of lexical items,  
namely infant and baby, constituting this thesis' object of analysis, is contrastively studied along a 
number of grammatical parameters.
The Oxford English Dictionary (OED) defines the central sense of infant as “[a] child 
during the earliest period of life (or still unborn); now most usually applied to a child in arms, a 
babe”, and that of baby as “[a] very young child, esp. one not yet able to walk and dependent on the 
care of others; an infant. Also applied to an unborn child” (OED on infant and baby, respectively, 
[online]). As is obvious, the meanings of infant and baby overlap considerably, and together with 
babe, defined by the OED as “[a] very young child; a baby” (OED on babe, [online]), their 
definitions are, in fact, explicitly circular. Yet, although there is substantial semantic overlap 
between infant and baby, there does, nonetheless, seem to exist a difference in affective meaning 
between them. Cruse (1986: 275-276) argues that baby has an inherent expressive potential which 
infant lacks. That is, baby is used in expressions in which it functions to overtly convey its user's 
affectively positive stance towards its referent, whereas no such overtly evaluative usage seem to 
exist for infant. Substituting baby for infant in an expression such as Oh, look – a baby! Isn't he 
adorable? (275) would seem intuitively (i.e., conventionally) odd, and perhaps even more so when 
suprasegmentally, and/or extra-linguistically (e.g., by means of facial gestures), indicating such an 
evaluative usage. In their presentation of how to measure and rate affective meanings: “Affective 
Norms for English Words”, Bradley & Lang (1999) provide figures corroborating the notion of a 
difference in affective meaning between infant and baby. Using a scale of 1 to 9 to measure 
affective valence (displeasure – pleasure), baby received a mean value of 8.22, and infant one of 
6.9515. In the test designed by Bradley & Lang, a rating below 5 corresponded to a value of 
15 Interestingly, Bradley & Lang's results demonstrate clearly distinguishable differences between the sexes in the 
affective values given to infant and baby. Not only did men, on average, rate both words as less affectively positive 
than women: 6.05 vs. 7.71 (men), and 7.95 vs. 8.65 (women), for infant and baby, respectively, but the ratio, or 
proportional difference, between them also differed substantially between men and women. For men, baby could 
thus be seen as being 158% more affectively positive than infant, whereas for women, that difference was only 24%.
It should be noted, however, that just as much as these numbers seem to indicate a noticeable difference between the
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displeasure (1 being the most displeasing), one above 5 to a value of pleasure, and one of exactly 5 
to affective neutrality, being neither significantly pleasing, nor displeasing. Thus, baby can loosely 
be said to have been rated 65% more affectively positive, or pleasurable, than infant, receiving a 
3.22 on the, as it were, 4 point positive side of the scale (i.e., ranging from 5.01 to 9), compared to 
the 1.95 received by infant.
According to the OED, baby is etymologically derived from the affixation of the -y / -ie  
suffix to babe (OED on baby, [online]). This suffix is “[u]sed to form pet names and familiar 
diminutives” (OED on -y | -ie suffix, [online]), and can, according to Stubbs (1996), be considered a
case of morphologically marked (i.e., forming part of lexical) modality (see previous section), 
“encod[ing] meanings such as informality, intimacy, childishness and femininity” (206). At present, 
however, baby would not seem to constitute a less formal, or more intimate, form of babe, but 
rather simply the most common alternative for expressing the central sense (i.e., 'a very young 
child') of both words (OED on babe, [online]). Baby and babe could in this ways be said to form an 
etymologically related pair, and part of the semantic contrast between this pair and infant could then
be understood as an instance of the genre-bound lexico-semantic variation rooted in the introduction
of Latin (or French) terminology within certain social institutions, principally from the 11th century 
onwards (Stubbs 2001: 38)16. The introduction of Latinised vocabulary within certain prestigious 
genres, such as medicine and law, consequently resulted in the creation of numerous synonymous, 
although often clearly genre-bound, lexical pairs, such as infant and baby17. In this way, infant 
could, very simplistically, be thought of as a (potentially) more formal way of saying baby, and, 
reversely, baby a (potentially) more intimate way of referring to an individual as a very young child.
Given such genre-based semantic differences, it would seem reasonable to assume 
corresponding grammatical differences between infant and baby. That is, given that linguistic 
expressions fundamentally reflect conceptualisations, and conceptual domains (i.e., knowledge) 
reside in social practices18, then differences between such practices (i.e., genres) would reasonably 
be manifest in the structuring, or grammar, of their respective linguistic expression. In other words, 
if the semantic content of infant and baby exists in and through their respective expressional totality
sexes, it should probably also be seen as an indication of the relative inappropriateness of ascribing too much 
importance to these ratios, at least until further research on this topic can be provided.
16 According to the OED, infant found its way into English from Latin via the Old French forms enfant, -aunt (OED 
on infant, [online]).
17 According to the OED, infant still retains its legal sense of '[a] person under (legal) age; a minor. In common law, 
one who has not completed his or her twenty-first year; in the case of a ruler, one who has not reached the age at 
which he becomes constitutionally capable of exercising sovereignty' (online), whereas no equivalent exist for baby, 
nor babe, even though historically both of them have had the meaning of 'a child (of any age); a minor' (OED on 
infant, baby, and babe, respectively, [online]).
18 See, e.g., Taylor (2003: 86).
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(see section 2.2.), then difference in meaning between them should be mirrored in the expressions 
they form part of. These (potential) differences could then be taken as examples of how affective 
meaning (subsuming, at least, intimacy under a superordinate category of affect(-ive meaning)) may
impact grammar, or the meaning-creative structuring of meaningful units.
3. Method: Predicative Structure Analysis (PSA)
The purpose of this thesis is to examine potential grammatical effects of affective meaning. By 
comparing how 100 expressions, or instantiations, of each of the two lexical items infant and baby 
differ from one another, clues to understanding such grammatical effects are taken to be obtained. 
Given the understanding of the clause as the basic meaningful structure (see section 2.2.), analytical
focus quite naturally falls on the grounded, or finite, clause, being understood as the basic unit of 
(predicative) meaning in which the two lexical types (i.e., infant and baby) are instantiated. 
Therefore, every (grounded) clause, in which a token (instantiation) of infant or baby occurs, is 
considered an instantiation of the two types' semantic potential, and functions as such as the 
demarcation of analytical focus.
The analysis of clausal instantiations aims at obtaining data on the predicative structures 
which the two types form part of. Two principal structural aspects are of relevance for the analysis: 
Which (lexical) entities that predicatively co-occur, and the semantic nature of those predicative co-
occurrences. Basically, this corresponds to analysing clausal constructions on two levels: 
predicative structuring of lexical co-occurrence in clauses, and referential grounding of tokens and 
the predicative structures they form part of, both levels of analysis respectively explained in more 
detail in sections 3.1. and 3.2.. In section 3.3., the material from which the object of analysis (the 
instantiations of two lexical items infant and baby) is obtained, as well as, the rationale for its 
selection, and the object of analysis' general instantiation in this material, is briefly described.
3.1. Deconstruction of clausal instantiations into predicative structures
The deconstruction the two types' clausal instantiations into predicative structures (PS19) is intended
as a means to allow for a practicable analysis and comparison of the semantic potential of the two 
types (infant and baby). That is, by breaking down clausal instantiations into their predicative 
components, a more detailed analysis of the two types' semantic content becomes possible, 
19 Nb. PS is throughout this thesis used to denote both the singular; predicative structure, as well as the plural 
predicative structures.
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expectedly providing a fuller and more complex picture of the object of study; the potential 
grammatical effects of affect.
Understanding predication as the attribution of a property to an entity (i.e., token) and/or the
description of a relation between entities (see, for example, Gamut 1991a: 65-69), the analytic focus
is just as much on the relationships that the tokens of two types form part of, as it is on which 
properties that are ascribed to them. Deconstructing clausal instantiation, both kinds of predication 
(i.e., attribution of a property to an entity and description of a relation between entities) are 
subsumed under the general notion of relationship, which instead distinguishes between processual 
(which typically develop or change over time) and non-processual (backgrounding temporally 
based mutability; being understood atemporally) predications, or relationships (Langacker: 99-100).
That is, instead of a classification of PS based on valency (i.e., the number of arguments of a 
predicate), focusing on a predicate's relation to time (i.e., as being, roughly, either temporally static 
or dynamic) basically allows for a classification of PS according to whether a token serves as an 
argument of an adjective construction or a verb construction20, respectively corresponding to a non-
processual and a processual relationship.
Regardless the type of PS, i.e., whether it is processual or non-processual, all PS are made 
up of two kinds of elements: autonomous (i.e., arguments) and dependent (i.e., predicates) ones. In 
brief (and simplistically), autonomous elements are capable of conceptually, so to speak, standing 
alone, whereas dependent elements require some other element(s) in order to be conceptualised 
(Langacker 2008: 199). Archetypically, nominal lexical items, such as, e.g., infant and baby, are 
thus considered autonomous, and adjectival and verbal lexical items, such as, e.g., small and cry, 
dependent.
Simplistically, the two types' clausal instantiations are thus deconstructed into PS 
corresponding to the clauses' verb and adjective constructions, respectively corresponding to 
processual and non-processual PS. Serving as an example containing both types of relationships 
(i.e., processual and non-processual) is the clause The new baby might inherit the condition. The 
clause as a whole exemplifies a prototypical processual PS in which The new baby and the 
condition both serve as arguments (being autonomous elements) to the predicate (being a dependent
element) corresponding to the lexical verb of the clause's finite verb construction; inherit (the modal
might being disregarded at this level of analysis21). The complex nominal; The new baby, in turn, 
illustrates a typical non-processual PS in which new functions as a non-processual predicate (being 
20 The full picture is obviously somewhat more complex, including, e.g., also prepositional phrase and adverbial 
constructions. Nonetheless, as is demonstrated in the actual analysis, the bulk of the derived PS is made up of 
adjective and verb constructions.
21 The analysis of semantic content such as, for example, modal verbs and other non-lexical referential meanings are 
explained in section 3.2.; Analysis of referential grounding of predicative structures and tokens.
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a dependent element), and baby as its (autonomous) argument (disregarding the definite article at 
this level of analysis22). The deconstruction of the clause's two relationships corresponds to the 
following two PS (in which (A) and (D) stand for autonomous and dependent (element), 
respectively):
1) (A) new baby + (D) inherit + (A) condition
2) (A) baby + (D) new
The predicative components (i.e., the autonomous and dependent elements) derived from the
deconstruction are all rendered in the lexematic form of the of the expressions which they 
correspond to. That is, all morpho-syntactic markings serving as means of referential grounding, 
such as, for example, definite and plural markings for nominals, and person, tense, and modal 
markings for verb constructions, are disregarded with respect to the formal representation of the 
predicative components (referential grounding being dealt with in section 3.2.).
For the sake of analytical simplicity, all clausal instantiations of the two types, whether they 
be declarative, interrogative, imperative, or exclamative, are deconstructed as were they 
conventionally structured declaratives in the active voice (i.e., SVO's). This means, among other 
things, that participles are analysed in accordance with the processual relationships they imply, or 
indirectly evoke. In a similarly simplifying fashion, all adjective constructions are also 
deconstructed alike, meaning that the attributive the small baby and the predicative the baby is 
small are both rendered (A) baby + (D) small.
All PS are then classified according to their structural type (PS type). The principal 
distinction, already explained, is that between processual and non-processual PS. Both processual 
and non-processual type PS are then divided into subcategories distinguishing between a total of 
four different grammatical (in the sense of both form and meaning) structures. Processual type PS 
are separated into subject and object position type PS, depending on whether a token serves as a 
subject (roughly, the principal participant of a process), or an object, of a process. Non-processual 
type PS are divided into adjective and prepositional phrase type PS, respectively denoted as (A) + 
(D) and (A) + (D) + (A) type PS. In addition to the these four PS types, a fifth type corresponding to 
predicate nominatives, and rendered (A) + (A), is also given, but considered to fall outside the 
processual – non-processual PS type distinction.
22 The analysis of non-lexical referential meanings is explained in section 3.2..
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3.2. Analysis of referential grounding of predicative structures and tokens
The analysis of the referential grounding of PS and tokens aims at elucidating possible relations 
between three seemingly related aspects of referential grounding (as explained in section 2.3.): 
epistemological status, reference type (as defined below), and semantic prosody. By analysing how 
the first two of these means, or parameters, of grounding relate to semantic prosody, and how these 
relations may vary between the two types (infant and baby), information pertaining to the role, or 
potential effects, of affect(-ive meaning) is taken to be obtained. That is, by letting semantic 
prosody function as a reference point, the potential relations between affect(-ive meaning) and 
epistemological status and reference type becomes possible to analyse.
All three of these features of referential grounding (or simply grounding) are arguably 
intimately linked to affect in either a general or direct manner. In the case of semantic prosody, the 
connection is obvious, as it could effectively be equated to affective meaning (as defined in section 
2.3.). With regard to epistemological status and reference type, the relation could be said to be of a 
more general kind, as both features correspond to principal facets of grounding, and, as such, are 
inherently subjective (and therefore pertinent to a study of the grammatical effects of affect). In 
addition to such a general connection, however, both epistemological status and reference type 
would intuitively also seem to be closely connected to the notion of concreteness (and, 
consequently, intimately connected to affect). That is, in addition to supposedly being relevant as 
objects of analysis because of being (subjectively) referential, both epistemological status and 
reference type (as defined below) would seem to centrally encompass key notions of concreteness, 
namely the real vs. the hypothetical, and the actual, or specific, vs. the abstract, or generically non-
specific.
3.2.1. Analysis of semantic prosody of predicative structures
As already explained in section 2.3., the socio-expressive, or good – bad, parameter is taken to 
constitute a fundamental facet of referential grounding, or means of discursive orientation, which in
its structural basic-ness is not unlike, for example, spatial, or temporal grounding. Hence, socio-
expressive meaning is taken to fill a referential function similar to that of, for example, 
epistemological status and reference type (explained below), and thus considered a form and a 
means of grounding. A value along a parameter of good – bad ascribed to an entity is referred to as 
a value of that entity's semantic prosody (i.e., its prosodic value), and can basically be equated to 
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that entity's affective meaning23. Most fundamentally, “[s]emantic prosody is an expression of the 
innate human need and desire to evaluate entities in the world they inhabit as essentially good or 
bad” (Morley & Partington 2009: 141).
All PS derived from the deconstruction of the two types' clausal instantiations are judged as 
being prosodically either positive, negative, or inconspicuous. The prosodic value of a PS is 
determined by a general assessment of the conventional socio-expressive meaning of the clausal 
instantiation's sense (i.e., simplistically the sense of its predicate) to which the PS corresponds. The 
sense of a PS is inferred from analysing the particular meaning of the clausal instantiation (to which
it corresponds) relative to the transcribed sentence in which it occurs. In this way, every PS in 
which a token occurs is qualitatively judged as expressing either a positive, negative, or 
inconspicuous semantic prosody. For many PS, determining the prosodic value can be thought of as 
fairly straightforward, as the interpretation of the conventional socio-expressive meaning of many 
(of the clausal instantiations corresponding to the) PS can be said to be unequivocally positive or 
negative, as with, for example, (A) [FEMALE] + (D) love + (A) baby, and (A) defendant + (D) molest + 
(A) infant. For most PS, however, the semantic prosody is much more difficult to ascertain, and, 
consequently, these PS are deemed prosodically inconspicuous (cf., for example, (A) infant + (D) 
four weeks old, and (A) baby + (D) another).
PS deemed to unequivocally express a certain prosodic value, such as, for example, the two 
PS mentioned above having love and molest as their respective predicates (i.e., dependent 
elements), are categorised as core instantiations of that prosodic value. A PS considered to manifest 
a core instantiation of a prosodic value therefore corresponds to a definite, and without any doubt, 
prototypical instantiation of that prosodic value. Reversely, a PS deemed to potentially express a 
certain prosodic value is classified as a peripheral instantiation of that prosodic value24. For 
example, the various clausal instantiations corresponding to the (partial) PS (D) have [give birth to] +
(A) baby are all classified as being peripheral (i.e., potential) expressions of a positive semantic 
prosody. The conventional socio-expressive meaning of a typical clausal instantiation corresponding
to this PS is taken to often, but not necessarily (nor always), express a positive affective meaning. 
Because of this, these PS are classified as corresponding to peripheral, or potential, instantiations of 
a positive semantic prosody.
23 Whereas affect(-ive meaning) is understood two-dimensionally (along two parameters: hedonic valence, and 
arousal), semantic prosody could be said to principally concern only one parameter, namely good – bad (i.e., socio-
expressive meaning; roughly the symbolisation of affect).
24 The core – peripheral distinction corresponds to the idea of varying degrees of centrality for different semantic 
content relative the meaning (or rather, sense) of a lexical item (see, e.g., Langacker's brief description of 
encyclopaedic semantics (2008: 38-39)).
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3.2.2. Analysis of epistemological grounding of predicative structures
As described in section 2.3., epistemological status would seem to be both intricately and 
intrinsically connected to both affective meaning and meaning at large. In fact, meaning (at large) 
would reasonably seem to be, in and of itself, fundamentally related to, or even dependent on, 
epistemological status. Due to these reasons and the ones given above (section 3.2.), all predicative 
structures derived from the deconstruction of the clausal instantiations of the two types are analysed
along a parameter of epistemological status and deemed either intensional or extensional (marked 
IN and EX, respectively).
Most simplistically, “[t]he intension of an expression is something like its conceptual 
content, while its extension comprises all that [in practice] exemplifies that conceptual content” 
(Gamut 1991b:14). This means that the extension of an expression can be said to be either true or 
false, whereas the intension of an expression does not concern the expression's truth or falsity 
(directly). The perhaps most easily comprehensible example of this difference is that between 
expressions involving entities whose epistemological status is conventionally taken to be mythical 
(or even false), as in expressions such as Look! A unicorn! and Bob claims he's seen a unicorn. In 
the first one, the person uttering the expression is implicitly asserting the actual existence of a 
unicorn, i.e., making an assertion whose truth or falsity, or denotative applicability, can be either 
affirmed (as being true), or questioned and dismissed (as being false). In the latter expression, the 
person uttering the expression is merely asserting that Bob claims [that … ], and the actual existence
of a unicorn is something which, at least with respect to the expression itself, is left undecided. In 
other words, the existence, or epistemological status, of a unicorn is deemed extensional in the first 
expression, and intensional in the second25.
If a PS is deemed extensional, its factual existence is judged as being entailed by the 
expression(s) which it forms part of. That is, an extensional PS is one which is given a matter-of-
fact status, i.e., presented as being an actual fact. An intensional PS, on the other hand, is one whose
existence (i.e., epistemological status) is deemed hypothetical, or merely possible. Given its 
expressional co-text, its factual existence is not entailed, and an intensional PS is, hence, judged as 
not (directly) concerning the real, and/or factual world, but merely a possible one.
Using so-called modal verbs and adverbs, such as could, would, and perhaps, could be 
thought of the archetypical manner in which the intensional epistemological status of a PS is 
marked26. In clauses such as X [transitive verb; eat / cook / etc.] Y, insertion of a modal verb and/or 
25 See, for example, Dowty, Wall and Peters (1981: 141-154) for a basic introduction to the extensional – intensional 
distinction.
26 See, e.g., Gamut (1991b: 45-46) for a brief description of intensional constructions and/or contexts, or von Fintel & 
Heim (2011, chapter 3) for a basic introduction to the semantics of modality.
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adverb modifying the predicate (i.e., main verb) would thus render the epistemological status of the 
corresponding PS hypothetical, or possible. That is, the PS of X  / eat / cook / … Y would not be 
presented as a fact, but merely as a possibility, just as the PS (A) baby + (D) inherit + (A) condition is 
considered intensional in the expression The new baby might inherit the condition. By the same 
token, PS derived from expressions of temporally future-oriented descriptions, such as (She is 
staying with [X]) after her baby is born, and My baby will be safe with them, are also deemed 
intensional27. Similarly, complement clauses to so-called intensional verbs, such as believe, think, 
and want, also have an intensional epistemological status, as in We believe the infant was kicked, 
where the PS (A) [X] + (D) kick + (A) infant is not deemed factual, but merely hypothetical, being an 
object of belief 28. Expressions which could be said to have the illocutionary force of orders, advice, 
and/or representing deontic modality, are also judged as being intensional, as, for example, Look at 
that perfect baby[!], since the PS derived from the occurrence is merely one preferred by the 
producer of the expression (cf. I want you to look at … ).
The epistemological status of expressions deemed as questions is determined as were the 
expressions declarative (see previous section; 3.1.). Hence, a question such as Would you [girls] 
abort the baby or keep the baby?, whose PS are rendered as (A) [girl] + (D) abort + (A) baby and (A) 
[girl] + (D) keep + (A) baby, is effectively equated to a declarative like Girls would abort or keep the 
baby, and therefore deemed intensional. Conversely, a question such as Where was the baby? is 
deemed extensional, since it is equated to a declarative expression like The baby was here / there / 
[at location X].
As made obvious in, for example, the expression A couple tried to sell an infant, different PS
from the same occurrence may differ in epistemological status:
1) EX: (A) couple + (D) try + (A) to sell infant
2) IN: (A) [couple] + (D) sell + (A) infant 
Since PS1 is derived from an expression given a matter-of-fact status it is deemed extensional. 
Conversely, PS2, being derived from the complement clause of A couple tried … , is deemed 
intensional, since it corresponds to that which was, as it were, tried (to do), and not what was 
27 Nb. PS referring, so to speak, back in time, being marked in the past tense are not considered intensional, but 
extensional in the PSA. See, e.g., von Fintel & Heim (2011, chapter 6) for a basic introduction to the semantics of 
tense.
28 See, e.g., von Fintel & Heim (2011, chapter 2), for a basic introduction to propositional attitudes.
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actually done.
3.2.3. Analysis of reference type of tokens
In the initial qualitative analyses of the material, one of the first things noticed was what seemed to 
be a pervasive difference in how infant and baby were being used to refer. That is, there seemed to 
exist something potentially close to a general difference in what could be called reference type, or 
the kind of conceptual entity (or category of entities) being referred to. The analysis of reference 
type is therefore intended to disclose how the instantiated occurrences (i.e., the tokens) of infant and
baby are used referentially. All tokens are classified as being instances of one of two reference 
types, referring either to an identifiable, and specific, individual (i.e., entity), or a non-specific (and 
exclusively discursive) representation (i.e., instantiation) of a category of individuals. As already 
mentioned above (section 3.2.), this referential dimension would, just like epistemological status, 
also seem to be intrinsically connected with affect in more than just a general manner, strongly 
connoting to core aspects of concreteness and tangibility.
By means of qualitative readings of each instantiated occurrence's co-text29, all tokens are 
judged as being either referentially specific or non-specific (marked SP and NS, respectively). That 
is, the referential type of each token is determined based on how the token is being used 
referentially in its co-text: Is it referring to an identifiable, and specific, individual, or an 
unidentifiable, non-specific, and merely imagined instantiation of a set of individuals pertaining 
exclusively to the (conceptual) realm of discourse30. Simply put, tokens deemed referentially 
specific identify (point to and characterise) a particular individual (or set of individuals31), as in, for
example, She assumed she was saying goodbye to her two-pound infant, whereas tokens judged 
non-specific identify a conjured up referent which only exists discursively, as in, for example, Come
on, how many stories have we covered where Mom fell asleep and the baby wandered off into a 
pond, into traffic, into a forest?. Although this referential distinction seems both intuitively and 
empirically (see section 4) closely related to epistemological status, the two are not the same and 
their overlap is incomplete (and, furthermore, a token's epistemological status is not necessarily the 
same as its predicative structure's epistemological status). That is, even though referentially specific
tokens for the most part are inherently extensional (and also tend to form part of extensional, more 
often than intensional, PS), as in The infant was found by a rural fisherman in this area, a 
29 The COCA provides roughly 150-170 words of co-text for all tokens.
30 See, for example, Langacker (2008: 270-71).
31 Nb. The type referential distinction made between specific and non-specific reference has nothing to do with 
singular vs. plural.
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referentially specific token can, just as well, be intensional, as in […] the angel came in a dream to 
[Joseph] and told him the pregnancy was an act of God, and the baby [i.e., Jesus Christ] would 
save the people from their sins32. Tokens deemed non-specific, however, are always inherently 
intensional (although they can and do form part of extensional PS), as they do not identify any 
particular real, or fictive, world individual, but merely a virtual, or imagined, representation of a 
category of individuals. In other words, referentially non-specific tokens always refer to 
abstractions, and can be divided into two principal subtypes, having either generic or virtually 
instantiative referents. Tokens which refer to a generic entity thus denote an entire class, or 
category, of individuals, as in, for example, All the constituents of human milk are just perfect for 
the human infant. A token referring to a virtually instantiative referent, however, instead denotes an 
imaginary representation, or instantiation, of such a class, or category, of individuals without 
actually identifying any one particular individual, as in, for example, There's a medical doctor, a 
sailor, a homosexual, an infant, an old woman and so on. So who should be thrown overboard? 
(forming part of a moral puzzle).
Since reference type concerns tokens and not PS (of tokens), the reference type of an 
instantiated occurrence of a type (i.e., a lexical, and/or clausal, instantiation of infant or baby) is 
always constant. That is, although the epistemological status of different PS derived from the same 
occurrence (i.e., expression) may differ (as described in the previous section; 3.2.2.), an 
occurrence's reference type is always the same, regardless the epistemological status of the PS 
which a token forms part of. Returning to the clausal instantiation A couple tried to sell an infant, 
this means that the token's reference type remains the same, even though the epistemological status 
of the two PS that the token is part of differs:
1) EX/NS: (A) couple + (D) try + (A) to sell infant
2) IN/NS: (A) [couple] + (D) sell + (A) infant 
In other words, the reference type of a token from whose clausal instantiation different predications 
(PS) may be derived is not affected by variance in epistemological status of such predications.
32 Nb. This is by no means intended as a claim on the actual epistemological status of Jesus Christ, merely reflecting 
the conventional (popular) secularly atheist stance in early 21st century Christian Sweden on this matter.
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3.3. Material: Rationale for selection and brief description
In order for this thesis' object of study; the (potential) grammatical effects of affect, (and, in 
particular, its results and conclusions) to be as generally valid as possible, the analysed material 
would have to be as representative as possible of linguistic expressions in general. Since a linguistic
expression's (or composition of expressions', i.e., text's) ontology (including grammar) can be 
thought of as greatly determined by its genre, influencing, among other things, its structure, content,
and register (e.g., Langacker 2008: 478), selection of a material for analysis would therefore have to
be governed by the degree of general linguistic representativeness of the material's genre. Given an 
understanding of (spoken) conversation as being “canonical, providing a basic model that other uses
of language mimic and adapt as needed” (Langacker 2008: 459)33, a material consisting of 
conversational data would then reasonably be the most suited to meet such a requirement of general 
linguistic representativeness.
The Corpus of Contemporary American English (COCA) provides a 109 million word 
corpus of spoken English, made up of roughly 4 million words from each year between 1990 and 
2015, and would, as such, more than likely constitute the world's largest corpus of spoken, 
conversational, English (COCA, [online]). The COCA's spoken corpus is composed of “[t]ranscripts
of unscripted conversation from more than 150 different TV and radio programs”, such as, for 
example, The Today Show (NBC), 60 Minutes (CBS), and The Jerry Springer Show (syndicated) 
(COCA, [online])34. Although this undoubtedly means that the bulk of the material most probably 
corresponds to what perhaps could be referred to as conscious media talk (including, for example, 
“relatively little profanity and perhaps avoiding highly stigmatized words and phrases like 'ain't got 
none'” (COCA on spoken corpus, [online])), the (chief) creator of the COCA still maintains that the 
spoken material, on a larger scale, “do[es] represent well non-media English” (Davies 2009: 162). 
That is, even though equating media texts, such as, news reports and talk shows, with casual 
conversation in terms of genre35 quite simply is erroneous, it would nonetheless seem reasonable to 
assume, as Davies claims, that there is a substantial overlap, not least with regard to lexico-
grammatical content, between the two types of text. In short, one could at least speculate that the 
principal difference between the two would have to do with productive deliberation and 
standardisation, or lack thereof; casually conversational texts supposedly manifesting higher 
degrees of general idiosyncrasy, for example with respect to topical scripts, lexico-grammar, 
33 Cf., for example, “Since language evolved as speech, in the life of the human species, all writing systems are in 
origin parasitic on spoken language” (Halliday & Matthiessen 2004: 7).
34 See, for example, Davies (2009) and (2010) for more detailed description of the COCA.
35 Genre being understood fundamentally as a way of using language, or a type of (typically interactive) linguistic 
activity (e.g., Langacker 2008: 477-478).
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purpose, and so on.
With regard to this thesis' object of analysis; the synonymous pair infant and baby, no 
considerable, or only very limited, differences in genre were identified in the COCA's spoken 
material. In fact, only the total material (i.e., the material from which the data analysed in the PSA 
was obtained) demonstrated tendencies of such differences, whereas none (or no considerable ones) 
were discerned in the material analysed in the PSA. That is, although it should be pointed out that 
no thorough genre analysis was undertaken, the only obvious difference in genre between infant and
baby seemed to be a topical one, exclusively distinguished in the total material, concerning topics 
which perhaps could be labelled as being medicine-, or health-related, archetypically involving 
constructions such as sudden infant death syndrome and infant mortality rate. This relative 
sameness of genre can also be seen as reflected in the frequency distribution of the two lexical 
types' (i.e., infant and baby) senses and constructions most commonly discerned. As shown in 
figures 1 and 2 (below), random samples of 100 instantiated occurrences of infant and baby 
manifest striking similarities, not least with regard to the frequency distribution of constructions 
denoting their central sense; 'a very young child' (see section 2.4.). That is, even though the use of 
baby differs from that of infant in that baby is used, as it were, polysemously, as an address of 
endearment, both infant and baby are mainly used in constructions in which their instantiations 
correspond to semantic variations closely connected to the central sense of 'a very young [and/or 
small] child'.
Figure 1 – Random sample of 100 instantiated
occurrences of infant in the COCA's spoken corpus
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Figure 2 – Random sample of 100 instantiated
occurrences of baby in the COCA's spoken corpus
For example, also constructions categorised as noun + noun constructions, in which a token fills an 
adjectival, or attributive, function (i.e., modifying the head noun) demonstrate these semantic 
similarities, as exemplified in constructions such as baby pictures, infant son / daughter, and baby 
[name] (e.g., baby Ryan). In fact, the most salient difference in the COCA's spoken material 
between infant and baby instead seems to have to do with the two types' respective total number of 
instantiated occurrences, there being 17,331 occurrences of baby, compared to only 910 for infant, 
corresponding to a baby:infant ratio of more than 19:1.
Since the semantic overlap (i.e., synonymous relation) between infant and baby principally, 
however, concern those constructions in which a token serves as a head noun denoting the central 
sense of 'a very young child', only tokens which are deemed to be instantiations of this kind are 
included in the PSA. That is, although the semantic overlap between the two lexical types is 
substantial (for several of their construction types), it is not that uncommon to come across 
constructions in which the meaning of a token is difficult to determine with certainty (or easily 
misjudge), not least due to only partial grammatico-semantic overlap (i.e., inconsistent usage, or 
meaning, of one of the two lexical types' constructions), as with, for example, infant brother and 
baby brother36. Therefore, the 100 instantiated occurrences of infant and baby (i.e., 100 of each 
36 Whereas infant brother would seem to be exclusively used to denote something like 'a brother '[t]hat is an infant, or 
like an infant'', baby in baby brother would instead seem to be variously used to “designat[e] a younger sibling” as 
well as “a very young or newborn child” (OED on infant, and baby, respectively, [online]).
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lexical type) obtained from the COCA's spoken material for the purpose of being analysed in the 
PSA are exclusively composed of tokens corresponding to head nouns whose meaning has been 
ascertained to denote the two types' central sense of 'a very young child'. All data analysed in the 
PSA have, hence, been subject to qualitative readings focused on identifying and ascertaining, not 
only the sense, but also the textual status, of each instantiated occurrence; only including 
spontaneous, non-scripted, text (i.e., discarding all quotes, voice-overs, etc.)37. In addition, no more 
than 2 occurrences from the same source on the same date have been included in the material 
analysed in the PSA, in order to limit the risk of a particular topic of a particular text (or rather, 
source on a given date) excessively influencing the results of the analysis.
4. Results
The Results section provides data on the distribution of the three means, or forms (i.e., parameters),
of referential grounding described in section 3.2. (and its subsections) for both infant and baby. The 
data can be seen as being of two kinds: (1) describing the general distribution of each form of 
referential grounding for infant and baby, respectively and comparatively; and (2) describing the 
relative distribution of epistemological status and reference type to the distribution of semantic 
prosody for infant and baby, respectively and comparatively. In other words, the distributions of 
epistemological status and reference type are relativised to the distribution of semantic prosody, in 
order to see how the first two may correlate with the third. The results, hence, provide data on both 
the individual and comparative referentially parametrical distribution of infant and baby, as well as, 
on how the distribution of semantic prosody, or the good – bad parameter, relate to that of both 
epistemological status and reference type.
Throughout this and the following two sections (i.e., sections 5. and 6.), epistemological 
status and reference type are collectively referred to as modal parameters, and separated from 
semantic prosody (even though semantic prosody is obviously also considered a kind of modality, 
or referential grounding, as described in section 2.3.). The distinction is, thus, merely a formal one, 
intended only to simplify the relativisation of epistemological status and reference type to semantic 
prosody. The values of each modal parameter are, in turn, collectively referred to as modal values. 
Hence, the referential grounding of each PS is given relative to two modal parameters: 
epistemological status and reference type, each with two possible modal values: extensional or 
intensional for epistemological status, and specific or non-specific for reference type. Strictly 
37 For every token, the COCA's spoken material provides an expanded context consisting of between roughly 150 to 
170 words.
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speaking, however, only epistemological status concerns the modality of PS, since reference type 
relates to the referential usage, or modality, of tokens. Together, the two modal values describing 
the referential grounding of each PS are referred to as a modal construction type. Hence, modal 
construction types are the different value combinations of epistemological status and reference type 
(i.e., modal values) which all PS manifest. Essentially, there are four possible combinations of 
modal values; extensional-specific, extensional-non-specific, intensional-specific, and intensional-
non-specific, although, variations, or deviations, due to the uncertainty of a particular modal value, 
do occur.
4.1. Distribution of modal values and modal construction types for infant and 
baby
The total number of PS analysed in the PSA are essentially the same for infant and baby, with totals 
of 166 and 161 PS, respectively. With the exception of the (A) + (A) PS type, also across the different
PS types analysed, the number of PS only differs at most around 20% between infant and baby (or 
27% more for infant than for baby, for non-processual (A) + (D) + (A) type PS). The total number of 
PS analysed in the PSA for infant and baby are given in table 1 according to PS types.
Table 1: Number of PS per PS type
infant baby
(A) + (A) 29 12
Non Processual
(A) + (D) 47 54
(A) + (D) + (A) 23 18
Processual
object position 52 59
subject position 15 18
Total 166 161
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Adding epistemological status to the equation, an indication of two seemingly opposing 
distributive tendencies of epistemological status for infant and baby emerges. As shown in table 2, 
there would seem to exist a tendency for baby to occur more often in extensional than in intensional
PS, with a factor of exactly 1.5. Although the epistemological preferences of processual and non-
processual type PS differ (as categories of PS), the two most extensive PS types for baby; non-
processual (A) + (D) type PS (corresponding to 34% of all its PS), and processual object position 
type PS (corresponding to 37% of all its PS), both manifest a distributive preference for 
extensionality (albeit only slightly for the latter) and have together a distribution of epistemological 
status corresponding to 61% extensional PS and 39% intensional PS (i.e., mirroring the numbers for
baby as a whole).
Table 2: Number of PS per PS type and epistemological status
infant baby
EX / IN (%) EX / IN (%)
(A) + (A) 21 / 8 (72% / 28%) 6 / 6 (50% / 50%)
Non Processual
(A) + (D) 22 / 23 (49% / 51%)* 38 / 16 (70% / 30%)
(A) + (D) + (A) 8 / 15 (35% / 65%) 14 / 4 (78% / 22%)
Total 30 / 38 (44% / 56%) 52 / 20 (72% / 28%)
Processual
object position 21 / 30 (41% / 59%)** 31 / 28 (53% / 47%)
subject position 7 / 8 (47% / 53%) 7 / 11 (39% / 61%)
Total 28 / 38 (42% / 58%) 38 / 39 (49% / 51%)
ALL PS 79 / 84 (49% / 51%) 96 / 65 (60% / 40%)
*Non-processual (A) + (D) for infant: For 2 PS epistemological status is deemed uncertain.
**Processual object position for infant: For 1 PS epistemological status is deemed uncertain.
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Conversely, infant would instead seem to favour epistemologically intensional PS, even though 
considering all of its PS gives an entirely even distribution of epistemologically intensional and 
extensional PS (fundamentally because the strong preference among (A) + (A) type PS for 
extensional epistemological status). That is, if one only considers processual and non-processual 
type PS (together corresponding to 82% of all PS for infant), the extensional:intensional ratio for 
infant would instead be 58:76, or 43% extensional PS compared to 57% intensional PS, resulting in 
an epistemological preference for infant completely opposite to that of baby.
Also the frequency distribution of reference type demonstrates completely opposite 
preferences for infant and baby, as shown in figure 1. Since reference type is token specific (see 
section 3.2.3.), its distribution exactly corresponds to that of the 100 instantiations (each) of infant 
and baby, and is independent from the distribution of PS. As made obvious in figure 1, infant is 
mainly (by a ratio of nearly 3:1) used non-specifically, whereas the near opposite holds for baby, 
manifesting a distributive preference for referentially specific usage by a factor of almost 2.
Figure 1: Frequency distribution of reference type for infant and baby
The frequency distribution of modal construction types can overall be seen as making the 
epistemological and type referential tendencies pointed out above even clearer. For infant, the 
preference for both intensional epistemological status and non-specific referentiality becomes 
obvious, as the intensional-non-specific construction type corresponds to 43% of all PS, as shown in
figure 2 and table 3.
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Figure 2: Relative distribution of modal construction types for infant
For baby, the same can be said to be true for its preference for extensional epistemological status 
and specific referentiality, as the extensional-specific construction type comprises more than half, or
52%, of all of baby's PS38, as shown in figure 3 and table 4. It should (however) also be pointed out 
that there are substantial differences in the distribution of modal construction types between 
different PS types for both infant and baby. For example, processual type PS demonstrate a 
considerably much higher distribution of intensional-specific construction types than non-
processual type PS, for both infant and baby. Also worth mentioning is the huge preference for the 
extensional-non-specific construction type for the (A) + (A) PS type for infant, resulting in the 
considerably much higher frequency distribution of this construction type for infant as a whole, as 
compared to when considering in isolation processual and non-processual type PS for infant39 (cf. 
38 It should be mentioned, though, that the relative distribution of specific referentiality is slightly higher when 
considering all of baby's PS (67%), than when considering baby's instantiations (64%).
39 For infant, the extensional-non-specific modal construction type comprises 20 of 29, or 69% of, PS for the (A) + (A) 
PS type. This very high frequency distribution for the (A) + (A) PS type can be said to, so to speak, drive up the 
INFANT - ALL PS
Relative distribution of modal construction types
EX / SP
EX / NS
IN / NS
IN / SP
                 Number of PS (percentage of total number of PS)
EX / SP EX / NS IN / NS IN / SP
ALL PS 34 (21%) 45 (28%) 71 (43%) 13 (8%)
Table 3: Distribution of modal construction types for infant
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section 4.2.1. and its subsections).
Figure 3: Relative distribution of modal construction types for baby
Since measuring the frequency distribution of modal construction types effectively 
corresponds to two-dimensionally representing the distribution of modal values, it provides a means
to construe the type referential and epistemological preferences of infant and baby as relativised to 
one another. That is, the distribution of one kind of modal value can be interpreted relative to the 
distribution of the other. As is shown in table 5, non-specific referentiality is not only, by far, the 
most common type referential value for infant as a whole, but also the most common type 
referential value for both infant's epistemologically intensional, as well as extensional, construction 
types, comprising 84 and 57 percent of the two epistemological values' respective construction 
overall (for all PS types) frequency distribution of the extensional-non-specific construction type , resulting in, 
among other things, an overall frequency distribution of 28%, as shown in table 3. However, if one disregards the 
(A) + (A) PS type, and instead only considers processual and non-processual type PS (which together make up 82% 
of all of infant's PS), the frequency distribution of the extensional-non-specific construction type is considerably 
lower, corresponding to only 19% of all processual and non-processual type PS for infant.
BABY - ALL PS
Relative distribution of modal construction types
EX / SP
EX / NS
IN / NS
IN / SP
                 Number of PS (percentage of total number of PS)
EX / SP EX / NS IN / NS IN / SP
ALL PS 81 (52%) 12 (8%) 40 (25%) 24 (15%)
Table 4: Distribution of modal construction types for baby
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types40. Conversely, infant's practically even distribution of epistemological status is reflected in the 
opposing epistemological preferences of its referentially specific and non-specific construction 
types. Whereas referentially non-specific construction types show a clear preference for intensional 
epistemological status (61% being epistemologically intensional), the opposite holds for 
referentially specific construction types, which instead favour extensional epistemological status 
(72% being epistemologically extensional). In other words, infant is overall primarily type 
referentially non-specific, and typically (with roughly a 3:2 ratio) its referentially non-specific 
instantiations form part of epistemologically intensional PS. However, when being instantiated as a 
referentially specific token, infant is instead most often used in epistemologically extensional PS.
For baby, the relativisation of modal value frequency distributions (i.e., frequency 
distribution of modal construction types) points to correlations both between extensional 
epistemological status and specific referentiality, as well as intensional epistemological status and 
non-specific referentiality, as indicated in table 6. That is, the frequency distribution of modal 
construction types shows that not only extensionality and specificity correlate, but also 
intensionality and non-specificity. Although baby as a whole demonstrates a clear preference for 
type referential specificity, factoring in epistemological status shows that this actually only holds 
true for extensional construction types (being 87% referentially specific), whilst intensional 
construction types instead favour non-specific referentiality with a ratio of more than 3:2 (62% of 
40 Considering only processual and non-processual PS, however, the SP:NS ratio for infant's epistemologically 
extensional PS changes completely, instead yielding a 57:43 ratio in favour of specific referentiality, whilst the 
corresponding ratio for intensional PS does not change at all (also demonstrating a SP:NS ratio of 16:84).
Type referential composition of epistemological values SP / NS (%)
43 / 57
16 / 84
Epistemological composition of type referential values EX / IN (%)
72 / 28
39 / 61
Table 5: Relativisation of modal values for infant
Epistemologically extensional
Epistemologically intensional
Type referentially specific
Type referentially non-specific
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intensional construction types being referentially non-specific). Similarly, referentially specific and 
non-specific instantiations of baby demonstrate opposing epistemological preferences (each with a 
ratio of more than 3:1), even though baby as a whole has a clear (3:2) preference ratio for 
extensional epistemological status (table 2, above). In fact, referentially specific and non-specific 
tokens of baby manifest exactly the same, although mutually opposite, degree of epistemological 
preference; referentially specific instantiations being 77% extensional, and non-specific ones 77% 
intensional. Altogether, baby would thus mainly be referentially specific and form part of 
epistemologically extensional PS (as indicated above; figure 1 and table 2), yet at the same time 
manifesting a clear instantiative correlation between epistemological status and reference type, 
resulting in the intensional-non-specific construction type being the second most common one (after
the extensional-specific).
4.2. Distribution of modal values and modal construction types per semantic 
prosody for infant and baby
In analysing the distribution of modal values and construction types per semantic prosody, only 
processual and non-processual type PS are considered. Since (A) + (A) type PS typically correspond 
to deconstructions such as, for example, (A) [FEMALE] + (A) token, derived from expressions such as,
for example, As an infant, she … , or she is a baby, semantic prosody seems generally not to be 
applicable to (A) + (A) type PS. Therefore, only processual and non-processual type PS are 
Type referential composition of epistemological values SP / NS (%)
87 / 13
38 / 62
Epistemological composition of type referential values EX / IN (%)
77 / 23
23 / 77
Table 6: Relativisation of modal values for baby
Epistemologically extensional
Epistemologically intensional
Type referentially specific
Type referentially non-specific
32
considered in the analysis of the distribution of modal values and construction types per semantic 
prosody.
 The numbers given below are calculated by applying the formula (number of core PS + 
(number of peripheral PS / 2)), and, hence, yield results which do not exclusively consist of 
integers. Since judging a PS as prosodically peripheral results in it being ambivalent in terms of its 
registered semantic prosody; it being either (1) possibly inconspicuous and possibly positive, or (2) 
possibly inconspicuous and possibly negative, the number of registered prosodically peripheral PS 
is double that of the actual number of PS which it is derived from (and corresponds to), and is 
therefore divided by two. That is, although this formula does not provide the actual number of PS 
for the three prosodic values (inconspicuous, negative, and positive), it does at least result in the 
total number of PS being correct, and, hence, guarantees (a) the accuracy of the relative distribution 
of any modal construction type not having any PS deemed prosodically peripheral, as well as, (b) 
statistically equal estimates of those construction types that do have prosodically peripheral PS41.
The frequency distribution of  prosodic values for infant and baby are given in tables 7 and 
8, respectively. In addition to the relative distribution of each prosodic value to the total number of 
PS (given in percentages), tables 7 and 8 also provide the number of PS for each construction type 
per prosodic value (according to the formula described above). In addition to the excluded (A) + (A) 
type PS, another 3 PS for infant, and 4 PS for baby, are also removed from consideration, since 
these all have at least one modal value deemed uncertain42. This means the number of PS 
considered in tables 7 and 8 is reduced from 166 to 134 for infant, and from 161 to 145 for baby, 
compared to the numbers given in table 1 (in section 4.1.). 
41 That is, if a PS is deemed prosodically peripheral, i.e., possibly being either positive, or negative, that PS will be 
registered as both 'possibly positive / negative' and 'possibly inconspicuous'. Considering PT in isolation, this 
double-registration does not pose a problem. However, when calculating the relative frequency distribution of 
modal construction types per semantic prosody, this kind of double-registration means that construction types with 
fewer (than average) prosodically peripheral PS become underrepresented (and vice versa). For example, if the total 
number of PS is 100, and the four construction types each have 20 core PS, and two construction types each have 
another 20 PS judged as peripheral, the number of registered PS reaches 120. This, however, would result in the two
construction types without any peripheral PS being relatively underrepresented, since their 20 core PS (each) would 
correspond to only 16.66%, instead of 20 percent, of the registered number of PS. Hence, in order to avoid having to
distinguish between total and registered number of PS, a formula such as the one given provides a simple (albeit 
simplistic) means to maintain (or secure, at least to some degree) the integrity of a set's relative distribution of 
actual PS.
42 For infant, there are 3 PS deemed both epistemologically and type referentially uncertain (marked ' ? / ? '), and for 
baby there are 3 PS judged 'EX/ ?', and 1 PS judged 'IN/ ?'.
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As shown in tables 7 and 8, the set of PS deemed prosodically inconspicuous comprises 
more than half of all (processual and non-processual) PS for both infant and baby. For baby, the set 
of prosodically inconspicuous PS is more than 3 times larger than both that of the prosodically 
negative, and that of the prosodically positive, PS (individually), comprising nearly two thirds of all
PS. For infant, however, the set of prosodically inconspicuous PS is only about 20% larger than that
of prosodically negative PS, and together these two sets make up almost all of infant's PS, whilst the
set of prosodically positive PS only constitutes roughly 5 percent of the total number of PS43. For 
baby, the number of prosodically positive and prosodically negative PS can instead be said to be 
fairly equal (although there are more than 30% more prosodically positve than negative PS), 
compared to the number of prosodically inconspicuous PS.
43 Since the set of prosodically positive PS for infant merely corresponds to 4 core and 6 peripheral PS, any 
conclusions drawn from this set should obviously be taken with a good grain of salt.
EX/SP EX/NS IN/NS IN/SP % of total number of PS
Positive prosody 0 2.5 4.5 0 5.22%
Negative prosody 10 4.5 32.5 10 42.54%
Inconspicuous prosody 23 18 27 2 52.24%
Table 7: Frequency distribution of prosodic values for infant
Processual and non-processual type PS
(total number of core prosodic PS + (total number of prosodically peripheral PS / 2)) = 134 PS
EX/SP EX/NS IN/NS IN/SP % of total number of PS
Positive prosody 12.5 2 8 6 19.66%
Negative prosody 10.5 2.5 4.5 4 14.83%
Inconspicuous prosody 54 5.5 24.5 11 65.52%
Table 8: Frequency distribution of prosodic values for baby
Processual and non-processual type PS
(total number of core prosodic PS + (total number of prosodically peripheral PS / 2)) = 145 PS
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Since tables 7 and 8 do not provide the distribution of core and peripheral PS separately, it 
may also be worth mentioning that infant and baby show similar distributive patterns (i.e., 
core:peripheral PS ratios) for both prosodically conspicuous and inconspicuous PS. For 
prosodically positive PS, the core:peripheral PS ratio is 0.56 for baby, and 0.67 for infant (although,
of course, infant only has 4 core and 6 peripheral PS registered as prosodically positive). For 
prosodically negative PS, on the other hand, the ratios are reversed, i.e., there are more core than 
peripheral PS, with a core:peripheral PS ratio of 3.8 for baby, and 13.75 for infant. The same 
relation also holds for prosodically inconspicuous PS, there being more core than peripheral PS for 
both infant and baby, respectively demonstrating ratios of 6.5 and 2.47.
As shown in tables 7 and 8, the relative distribution of modal construction types differs 
between prosodic values for both infant and baby. These differences in the relative distribution of 
construction types can be seen as being illuminated in figures 5 and 6, providing the relative 
distribution of modal construction types for the two prosodic values inconspicuous and negative for 
infant44, and figures 7, 8, and 9, showing the relative distribution of modal construction types for all 
three prosodic values (inconspicuous, negative, and positive) for baby.
Figure 5: Relative distribution of modal construction types
for prosodically inconspicuous PS for infant
44 Since the number of prosodically positive construction types only consists of 4 core and 6 peripheral PS for infant, 
prosodically positive PS are disregarded, the set being seen as too small to constructively consider.
INFANT - Relative distribution of modal construction types
Prosodicaly inconspicuous PS
EX/SP
EX/NS
IN/NS
IN/SP
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Figure 6: Relative distribution of modal construction types
for prosodically negative PS for infant
As made clear by comparing figure 5 and 6, there does for infant seem to exist a correlation 
between conspicuous semantic prosody and epistemological status. More precisely, the relative 
distribution of epistemologically intensional construction types is evidently higher for prosodically 
negative than for prosodically inconspicuous PS. Interestingly, the relative distribution of reference 
type seems unaffected by the differing prosodic values, even though the type referential 
composition in the distribution of epistemological status clearly changes as a result of prosodic 
variance, particularly for epistemologically intensional PS.
INFANT - Relative distribution of modal construction types
Prosodically negative PS
EX/SP
EX/NS
IN/NS
IN/SP
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Figure 7: Relative distribution of modal construction types
for prosodically inconspicuous PS for baby
Figure 8: Relative distribution of modal construction types
for prosodically negative PS for baby
BABY - Relative distribution of modal construction types
Prosodically inconspicuous PS
EX/SP
EX/NS
IN/NS
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BABY - Relative distribution of modal construction types
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Figure 9: Relative distribution of modal construction types
for prosodically positive PS for baby
Figures 7, 8, and 9 demonstrate a considerably less strong correlation between prosodic 
conspicuity and increasing intensionality for baby, than figures 5 and 6 do for infant, although there 
does seem to exist such a correlation also for baby (at least with respect to the difference between 
prosodically inconspicuous and positive PS, and the epistemological composition of type 
referentially specific construction types). Just as for infant, figures 7, 8, and 9 point to no (or very 
little) correlation between reference type and changing prosodic values for baby. Overall, figures 7, 
8, and 9 would seem to indicate less of a (clear) relationship between epistemological status and 
semantic prosody for baby, than what figures 5 and 6 could be taken to suggest is the case for 
infant.
4.2.1. Relative distribution of modal values and construction types per prosodic 
value for infant
Sections 4.2.1.1. to 4.2.1.4. provide short commentaries on the numbers (data) provided in table 9; 
the relative distribution of modal construction types per prosodic value for infant. As in the 
previous section, the set of prosodically positive PS is largely disregarded due to the very limited 
number of PS that it comprises. Tables 10 and 11 (below) provide detailed relativisations of the 
distribution of modal values given in table 9.
BABY - Relative distribution of modal construction types
Prosodically positive PS
EX/SP
EX/NS
IN/NS
IN/SP
38
4.2.1.1. Distribution of epistemological status per prosodic value
For infant, prosodically conspicuous (i.e., both positive and negative) PS demonstrate a preference 
for intensional epistemological status with a ratio of up to as much as 3:1, whereas the opposite 
holds for prosodically inconspicuous PS, instead manifesting a clear preference for extensional 
epistemological status. For PS deemed prosodically negative, 75% are epistemologically 
intensional, whilst the corresponding number for prosodically positive PS is 64%. For prosodically 
inconspicuous PS, the frequency distribution is the opposite, with an extensional:intensional ratio of
almost 3:2; 59% of PS being extensional and 41% being intensional.
4.2.1.2. Distribution of reference type per prosodic value
The distribution of reference type per prosodic value gives identical frequency distributions for 
prosodically inconspicuous and negative PS, respectively corresponding to specific:non-specific 
ratios of 36:64 and 35:65. For prosodically positive PS, this general preference for non-specific 
referentiality is even stronger, with all (although the set only consits of 4 core and 6 peripheral) PS 
being type referentially non-specific.
EX / SP EX / NS IN / NS IN / SP
Inconspicuous prosody
(Total number of PS = 70)
Negative prosody
(Total number of PS = 57)
Positive prosody
(Total number of PS = 7)
Table 9: Relative distribution of modal construction types per prosodic value for infant
Processual and non-processual type PS
((total number of core prosodic PS + (total number of prosodically peripheral PS / 2)) = 134 PS)
33% (23) 26% (18) 38% (27) 3% (2)
17.5% (10) 8% (4.5) 57% (32.5) 17.5% (10)
0% (0) 36% (2.5) 64% (4.5) 0% (0)
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4.2.1.3. Epistemological composition of type referential values per prosodic value
Just as for infant as a whole (table 5, section 4.1.), the epistemological composition of type 
referential values per prosodic value would seem to suggest seeming correlations between type 
referential specificity and epistemological extensionality, as well as, type referential non-specificity 
and epistemological intensionality. However, in addition to these modal value correlations, the 
numbers in table 10 also indicate a seeming correlation between prosodic conspicuity and an 
increasing distributive preference for intensional epistemological status, for referentially specific 
and non-specific construction types alike. That is, for both referentially specific and non-specific 
construction types, PS deemed prosodically negative manifest considerably stronger preferences for
epistemological intensionality than their prosodically inconspicuous counterparts.
4.2.1.4. Type referential composition of epistemological values per prosodic value
Since (A) + (A) type PS are not considered in the analysis of the distribution of modal values and 
construction types per semantic prosody, the type referential composition of the epistemological 
Table 10: Epistemological composition of type referential
Prosodically inconspicuous PS EX / IN (%)
92 / 8
40 / 60
Prosodically negative PS EX / IN (%)
50 / 50
 values per prosodic value for infant
Type referentially specific
Type referentially non-specific
Type referentially specific
Type referentially non-specific 12,/ 88
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status of infant's modal construction types given in table 11 differs fundamentally from that given in
table 5 (in section 4.1.). That is, as pointed in section 4.1., the huge preference among infant's (A) + 
(A) type PS for the extensional-non-specific construction type makes the overall type referential 
composition of epistemological status for infant differ significantly from that of processual and non-
processual type PS considered in isolation. In fact, and as shown in table 11, there would also for 
infant (just as for baby) seem to exist a correlation between epistemological extensionality and type 
referential specificity, as well as, epistemological intensionality and type referential non-specificity. 
Interestingly, there would also seem to exist a correlation between prosodic conspicuity and an 
increasing distributive preference for referential specificity. That is, for both epistemologically 
extensional and intensional construction types, a prosodically negative value results in an increasing
preference for type referential specificity.
Table 11: Type referential composition of epistemological
Prosodically inconspicuous PS SP / NS (%)
56 / 44
Prosodically negative PS SP / NS (%)
69 / 31
24 / 76
 values per prosodic value for infant
Epistemologically extensional
Epistemologically intensional 7,/ 93
Epistemologically extensional
Epistemologically intensional
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4.2.2. Relative distribution of of modal values and construction types per 
prosodic value for baby
Sections 4.2.2.1. to 4.2.2.4. provide short commentaries on the numbers (data) provided in table 12; 
the relative distribution of modal construction types per prosodic value for baby. Tables 13 and 14 
(below) provide detailed relativisations of the distribution of modal values given in table 12.
4.2.2.1. Distribution of epistemological status per prosodic value
For baby, prosodically inconspicuous PS manifest a preference ratio for extensional epistemological
status very similar to that of infant (see section 4.2.1.1.), with 63% of prosodically inconspicuous 
PS being epistemologically extensional for baby. Unlike for infant, however, the prosodically 
conspicuous PS do not demonstrate an epistemological preference for intensionality (but, if any, for 
extensionality). For baby, prosodically negative PS show a just as strong a preference for 
extensional epistemological status as prosodically inconspicuous PS, with 61% of prosodically 
negative PS being extensional, whilst prosodically positive PS are equally extensional (51%) and 
intensional (49%).
EX / SP EX / NS IN / NS IN / SP
Inconspicuous prosody
(Total number of PS = 95)
Negative prosody
(Total nuber of PS = 21.5)
Positive prosody
(Total number of PS = 28.5)
Table 12: Relative distribution of modal construction types per  prosodic value for baby
Processual and non-processual type PS
((total number of core prosodic PS + (total number of prosodically peripheral PS / 2)) = 145 PS)
57% (54) 6% (5.5) 26% (24.5) 11% (11)
49% (10.5) 11.5% (2.5) 21% (4.5) 18.5% (4)
44% (12.5) 7% (2) 28% (8) 21% (6)
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4.2.2.2. Distribution of reference type per prosodic value
Interestingly, all three prosodic values demonstrate strikingly similar type referential distributive 
patterns for baby, with all three of them having a preference ratio of roughly 2:1 in favour of 
referential specificity (68, 67, and 65 percent being type referentially specific, for prosodically 
inconspicuous, negative, and positive PS, respectively). Compared to infant, baby thus manifest a 
completely opposite distributive pattern for reference type, a pattern which, furthermore, is 
consistent regardless of varying prosodic values.
4.2.2.3. Epistemological composition of type referential values per prosodic value
As shown in table 13, factoring in semantic prosody into the epistemological composition of the 
type referential values for baby can by and large be said to point to the same correlation between 
specificity and extensionality, and non-specificity and intensionality, manifested by baby as a whole
mentioned in section 4.1. (see table 6). That is, semantic prosody does not seem to impact said 
correlations other than in terms of degree, as the polarity of epistemological preferences for 
referentially specific and non-specific construction types do not differ between prosodic values. 
There is, however, a decrease in the relative degree of that polarity for prosodically conspicuous PS 
compared to inconspicuous PS. This is particularly true for referentially specific construction types 
which are noticeably less extensional, and/or more intensional, as the prosodic value changes from 
inconspicuous to negative and/or positive. With regard to type referentially non-specific 
construction types, the same tendency would seem to hold for at least prosodically negative PS, 
although it must be pointed out that that set is very small (consisting of only 6 core and 2 peripheral 
PS (cf. table 12)), and, consequently, any conclusions drawn from it are fraught with a great deal of 
uncertainty.
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4.2.2.4. Type referential composition of epistemological values per prosodic value
Also with regard to the type referential composition of epistemological values, the above (in section
4.2.2.3.) mentioned correlations between specificity and extensionality, and non-specificity and 
intensionality, hold true for all three prosodic values, albeit only marginally for intensional 
construction types with a negative semantic prosody. That is, as shown in table 14, regardless the 
prosodic value, extensional construction types prefer type referential specificity, whilst intensional 
construction types prefer type referential non-specificity. However, similar to what is the case with 
Table 13: Epistemological composition of type referential
Prosodically inconspicuous PS EX / IN (%)
83 / 17
18 / 82
Prosodically negative PS EX / IN (%)
72 / 28
36 / 63
Prosodically positive PS EX / IN (%)
69 / 31
20 / 80
 values per prosodic value for baby
Type referentially specific
Type referentially non-specific
Type referentially specific
Type referentially non-specific
Type referentially specific
Type referentially non-specific
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the epistemological composition of reference type, prosodically conspicuous PS manifest a less 
strong preference for their correlative modal (type referential) value than prosodically 
inconspicuous PS. In fact, for both prosodically negative and positive PS, intensional construction 
types demonstrate a considerably more even type referential composition than their prosodically 
inconspicuous intensional counterparts.
Table 14: Type referential composition of epistemological
Prosodically inconspicuous PS SP / NS (%)
91 / 9
31 / 69
Prosodically negative PS SP / NS (%)
81 / 19
47 / 53
Prosodically positive PS SP / NS (%)
86 / 14
43 / 57
 values per prosodic value for baby
Epistemologically extensional
Epistemologically intensional
Epistemologically extensional
Epistemologically intensional
Epistemologically extensional
Epistemologically intensional
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5. Discussion
The Discussion section comprises two separate but related subsections. First, in section 5.1., the 
results presented in the Results section (section 4) are discussed in relation to the thesis' object of 
study; the potential grammatical effects of affect. Second, in section 5.2., certain issues with the 
theoretical framework and method used in the PSA's analysis of semantic prosody are discussed in 
some detail.
5.1. General discussion of the results of the PSA
Given what could be referred to as a relational view on meaning, outlined in section 2.2.; that the 
discrete meaning of a lexical item exists in and through its instantiated expressions, the results 
presented in section 4.2. would seem to corroborate Cruse's claim (1986: 275-276) that baby 
possesses an expressive potential for positive affective meaning which infant lacks (see section 
2.4.). That is, as shown in tables 7 and 8 (in section 4.2.), baby manifests a considerably higher 
frequency distribution of being instantiated in prosodically positive PS than infant. In addition, 
infant exhibits a frequency distribution of prosodically negative PS almost as high as its distribution
of prosodically inconspicuous PS, and could therefore also in that regard be said to differ 
significantly from the markedly positive instantiative potential displayed by baby. All in all, these 
numbers would seem to be pretty much in line with what can be said to have been expected, given 
the general outline of the use and meaning, and perhaps in particular Bradley & Lang's (1999) 
measurement of the affective valencies, of infant and baby in section 2.4.45.
Based on the assumption that the difference in affective meaning between infant and baby 
outlined in section 2.4. held true, it was also speculated (in section 2.4.) that other grammatical 
differences between infant and baby could be influenced by (or be due to) their diverging affective 
meanings. Although such a general explanatory model did (and still does) seem, not least 
beforehand, very tempting, the results yielded by the PSA can only be said to provide limited, or at 
best partial, indications of support for such an hypothesis, at least in its most general sense. That is, 
although, for example, the PS in which infant is instantiated clearly manifest a correlation between 
prosodic conspicuity (or rather, negativity) and an increasing frequency distribution of intensional 
45 Given infant's very strong distributive preference for prosodically negative PS, one may perhaps question the 
validity of a relational view on meaning; i.e., if infant is perceived as affectively positive (as Bradley & Lang's 
figures show), and yet so grossly overrepresented in prosodically negative PS (relative to baby), how can a 
relational view on meaning possibly hold true? The short answer would obviously have to be that the central 
semantic content of both infant and baby corresponds to their synonymous definitions, as given in a dictionary, such
as the OED; effectively corresponding to 'a very young child', and that it is this semantic content which carries much
(most?) of the shared positive affective meaning of both infant and baby.
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epistemological status, the nature of such a correlation; i.e., between prosodic conspicuity and a 
certain epistemological status, seems much more complex in the case of baby. With regard to the 
distribution of reference type, the results point to even more subtle, and/or complex, correlations, 
for both infant and baby. It is true, however, that affective meaning, or more precisely, prosodic 
variance, can be shown to relate to, and, thus, possibly influence, the distribution of both 
epistemological status and reference type, both for infant and baby, albeit in ways that seem 
somewhat different between the two lexical items.
As already mentioned in section 4.1. (see figure 1.), there is a fundamental difference with 
regard to type referential preference between infant and baby. In addition to it being tempting to 
relate this difference to the description of infant as a formal means of reference (to 'a very young 
child'), and baby as an intimate means of reference (see section 2.4.), the dissimilarity would also 
point to infant and baby commonly representing two fundamentally different kinds of conceptual 
constructs, respectively corresponding to two different kinds of model-theoretic entities: predicate 
terms and individual terms (see, e.g., Dowty, Wall & Peters 1981). That is, the type referentially 
non-specific instantiations (typical of infant) correspond to predicates, i.e., dependent elements 
(similar to adjectives), whereas the type referentially specific instantiations (typical of baby) 
correspond to what Löbner (2011) calls (functional and) individual nouns, identifying a particular, 
unique, individual. Still, this type referential difference between infant and baby would seem largely
unrelated to the two lexical items' affective meaning differences, as the overall frequency 
distributions of reference type do not vary with changing prosodic values, for neither infant nor 
baby (see section 4.2.1.2. and 4.2.2.2., respectively). Nonetheless, and as pointed out above, for 
both infant and baby, looking more closely at how type referential distribution relates to prosodic 
conspicuity does reveal seeming correlations between the two means of grounding: For infant, there
is a marked increase in the relative distribution of type referentially specific tokens when 
instantiated in prosodically negative PS, whereas for baby, prosodic conspicuity clearly seems to 
result in decreasing degrees of modal value polarity (see sections 4.2.1.4. and 4.2.2.4., respectively).
Considering epistemological status, for baby, the manner in which its distribution seems 
related to affective meaning could very much be said to parallel the nature and extent of the 
relationship described above between baby's distribution of reference type and prosodic conspicuity
(cf. section 4.2.2.3.). Simply put, for baby, the overall relationship between epistemological status 
and affective meaning can be said to seem fairly evident, yet limited. For infant, however, its high 
frequency distribution of epistemologically intensional PS (relative to baby) seems closely related 
to its high frequency distribution of prosodically negative PS. That is, for infant there is a rather 
obvious correlative relationship between prosodic conspicuity (which in the case of infant almost 
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entirely means negative semantic prosody) and increasing epistemological intensionality (both on 
the whole, and when considering the epistemological composition of the type referential 
distribution; section 4.2.1.3., table 10.). In itself, this apparent correlation between negative 
semantic prosody and an increasing distribution of epistemologically intensional PS could be seen 
as providing potential support in favour of both (1) the idea that affective meaning may impact 
grammar, and (2) that, therefore, also non-affective discrete semantic properties of a lexical item 
may be influenced by the lexical item's affectively (or rather, prosodically) instantiative totality. 
That is, although this correlation in no way proves that prosodic negativity be the reason for the 
distributive increase of epistemologically intensional PS, it undoubtedly allows for the idea to be 
entertained as an hypothesis. In the case of infant, this would then mean that the difference in 
affective meaning between infant and baby described above to some extent also account for the 
overall difference in epistemological status between them (cf. section 4.1., table 2.). The problem 
with such an hypothesis is of course that baby only demonstrates such a correlative pattern between 
semantic prosody and epistemological status to a very limited extent; it only holds true for the 
overall frequency distribution of epistemological status for prosodically positive PS, which, 
furthermore, have a very high degree of PS deemed peripherally (i.e., only potentially) prosodically 
conspicuous (positive). In the case of baby, the principal correlative tendency for prosodic 
conspicuity instead seems to be decreasing degrees of polarity in the extensional-specific and 
intensional-non-specific modal value preferences manifested by baby (and infant) as a whole (see 
section 4.2.2.3. and 4.2.2.4.).
The results provided by the PSA must, consequently, be said to be inconclusive with regard 
to the (exact) nature of the correlative patterns of changing prosodic values. That is, although the 
results of the PSA would seem to corroborate the claim made by Hunston (1994: 197), mentioned in
section 2.3., that epistemological status and the good – bad parameter (i.e., semantic prosody) are 
(inextricably) linked, the results also indicate that this holds true for the instantiations of infant and 
baby in quite different ways. Ultimately, rather than providing any answers, the results yielded by 
the PSA would instead have to be seen as raising a number questions, both with regard to the design
of the PSA and the understanding of affective meaning on which it is based.
5.2. Discussion concerning the PSA's analysis of semantic prosody
In analysing the results of the PSA, it gradually became clear that there were certain issues 
concerning the analysis of semantic prosody, both with regard to the design of its method, as well as
some of the theoretical premises on which it rested, which, in their current form, could not be 
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described as anything but problematic. Since the results yielded by the PSA to some extent must be 
said to be inconclusive (as described in the previous section), it seemed reasonable to examine if, 
and, in such a case, how, these issues may have contributed to the inconclusiveness of the results.
Therefore, this sections aims at critically examining the PSA's analysis of semantic prosody and its 
potential impact on the inconclusiveness of the results, as well as outlining ways in which the study 
of affective meaning could be improved.
The perhaps, in itself, most obvious problematic issue with the analysis of semantic prosody 
would have to be the difficulty with which positive prosodic values are identified by the PSA. This 
is reflected in the core:peripheral PS ratios for prosodically positive PS which demonstrate values 
lower than 1 for both infant and baby, as shown in table 15, below. It should be mentioned, 
however, that this identificatory issue has been observed and mentioned by others (albeit described 
in a slightly different way): Xiao & McEnery (2006: 106) writes that “[s]emantic prosodies are 
typically negative, with relatively few of them bearing an affectively positive meaning”, referring 
back to Louw's remark from 1993 saying that “[t]here seem, prima facie, to be more 'bad' prosodies 
than 'good' ones” (173). Be the distributive relationship between positive and negative semantic 
prosodies as it may, it does, notwithstanding, seem to be the case that the design of the PSA is such 
that expressions of positive affective meaning become difficult to, not only decisively determine as 
being positive, but ultimately identify.
infant
4 6 0.67
55 4 13.75
65 10 6.5
baby
15 27 0.56
19 5 3.8
79 32 2.47
Table 15: core:peripheral PS ratios for infant and baby
# of core PS # of peripheral PS core:peripheral PS ratio
Prosodically positive PS
Prosodically negative PS
Prosodically inconspicuous PS
# of core PS # of peripheral PS core:peripheral PS ratio
Prosodically positive PS
Prosodically negative PS
Prosodically inconspicuous PS
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One possible, and in such a case rather ironic (given the emphasis with which syntax is 
argued to contribute to meaning-creation, in section 2..2.), contributing reason to this identificatory 
difficulty may be the exclusion of syntactic structuring as a factor in the desconstruction of the 
clausal instantiations into PS (see section 3.1.) and the subsequent analysis of referential grounding 
of PS (and their tokens). Still, as argued already in 1977 by Kuno & Kaburaki in their rather famous
paper “Empathy and Syntax”, the syntactic organisation of an expression seems principally to 
reflect the empathy, roughly in the sense of non-emotional perspective, as opposed to the 
(emotional) sympathy, of the producer of an expression. That is, the syntax of an expression could 
be likened to what Kuno & Kaburaki calls a linguistic producer's camera angle, and not that 
producer's affective state, or feelings, towards what is referred to by an expressions. In the words of 
Kuno & Kaburaki, “[i]t is important to distinguish between the concept of empathy defined here as 
a technical linguistic term and the concept of sympathy” (1977: 629). Although the two may very 
well coincide, syntactic structuring would, hence, principally convey a linguistic producer's 
perspective, or camera angle, and not that producer's affective state relative to what is 
communicated in an expression.
A much more likely reason, then, for this difficulty with identifying positive semantic 
prosodies would instead seem to be the (relative to the assessment of reference type, see section 
3.2.3.) very limited analytic scope of the assessment of a PS' prosodic value. That is, whereas the 
the reference type of a token is inferred from its entire co-text provided by the COCA 
(corresponding to roughly 150-170 words), the prosodic value of a PS is determined by (mainly) 
considering only the sentence in which its corresponding clause is instantiated. In part, this apparent
flaw is due to the fact that the analysis of semantic prosody was initially but one part of a much 
wider analysis of predicative theme46 focused  not exclusively on affective meaning, but semanto-
lexical hyponymic categories of PS. In short (and as explained in section 3.2.1.), the assessment of 
a PS' prosodic value can be said to have been mainly based on the conventional, or typical, affective
meaning of the sense of the PS' predicate, rather than the particular, uniquely contextualised, 
affective meaning of the PS' corresponding clausal instantiation. Put somewhat differently, whereas 
the analysis of epistemological status and reference type is on the level of tokens, the analysis of 
semantic prosody can be said to be on the level of type.
Although there does not seem to be any apparent problem in identifying prosodically 
negative PS, it would, nonetheless, seem reasonable to assume that the limited analytical scope in 
46 In short, the analysis of predicative theme was intended to examine potential differences with respect to categories, 
or themes, of PS, in terms of hyponymies. All PS were classified according to its semantically central content as 
composed by its constitutive lexical items. Semantic prosody, or affective meaning, thus served as a means of 
classification, fundamentally focusing on expressive commonalities between PS.
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the assessment of semantic prosody impact not only the identification of positive prosodic values, 
but in fact the analysis of semantic prosody as a whole. This would, in turn, mean that not only the 
validity of the analysis of semantic prosody, but the entire PSA would have to be questioned. 
Ultimately, the question would seem to be how accurate the sentence-scoped analysis can be said to 
be relative to an analysis which considers the entire co-text of each clausal instantiation (and, hence,
would have to be considered more detailed) in assessing the semantic prosody, or affective 
meaning, of each PS' corresponding clausal instantiation.
In order to try to assess the impact which this seeming analytical defect may have had on the
analysis of the semantic prosody, two samples of PS with different core prosodic values were 
selected for prosodic re-analysis focusing on the PS' entire co-text. The re-analysis of these two 
samples examined the uniquely instantiative prosodic value of each PS' corresponding clausal 
instantiation relative to its co-text. In practice, this meant attempting to infer the semantic prosody 
(or affective meaning) of the PS relative to the assessed semantic prosody (-ies) of its co-text. The 
first sample comprises all 15 PS deemed to be core instantiations of a positive semantic prosody for 
baby in the PSA, and consists of both processual and non-processual PS at a ratio of about 1:1. This
sample includes PS with predicates (dependent elements) such as love, coddle, and happy. The 
second sample is made up by 15 randomly chosen (of the totally 55) PS judged as being core 
instantiations of a negative semantic prosody for infant in the PSA, also consisting of both 
processual and non-processual PS at a ratio of roughly 1:1. This prosodically negative sample 
includes (partial) PS such as kill, disabled, and murder + of. The results of the prosodic re-analysis 
are given in tables 16 and 17, below. The “ / ” should be read as but, meaning that, for example, 6 of
the 15 PS initially judged as being core instantiations of a positive semantic prosody for baby in the 
PSA were instead deemed to express an 'uncertain, but likely positive' semantic prosody (see table 
16).
Prosodic value Number of PS Epist. status Ref. type
EX  /  IN SP  /  NS
Very likely positive 5
Uncertain / Likely positive 6
Uncertain / Possibly inconspicuous 4
Table 16: Prosodic re-analysis of baby's 15 core positive PS
 33 /  2 44  /  1
72  /  4 83  /  3
84  /  0 84  /  0
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Since the two samples are relatively small (roughly corresponding to about 10% of the total 
number of PS analysed for infant and baby in the PSA, respectively), the results of the prosodic re-
analysis can obviously only be taken as potential indications. For this reason, and also due to the 
fact that all of the PS that were not judged as being 'very likely' instantiations of a conspicuous 
semantic prosody were primarily deemed to display an 'uncertain' prosodic value, there would seem 
to be little meaning in speculating about what the distribution of modal values may suggest. What 
does need to be addressed, however, is the staggeringly high degree of uncertainty in the re-
analysis' assessment of semantic prosody for PS previously deemed to possess conspicuously 
positive and negative prosodic values. In terms of consistency of results, the prosodic re-analysis 
must, therefore, be acknowledged as seriously questioning the PSA's classification of core 
instantiations as being “definite, and without any doubt, prototypical instantiation of that prosodic 
value” (see section 3.2.1.). As tables 16 and 17 show, roughly half to two-thirds of the re-analysed 
PS' prosodic values were judged as being impossible to determine with any real certainty. In fact, 
none of the PS prosodically re-analysed could at closer inspection be deemed as decisively 
expressing a certain semantic prosody (the highest degree of certainty attained instead being that a 
certain PS would correspond to a very likely expression a certain prosodic value). The fundamental 
reason as to why such a large number of PS were deemed prosodically 'uncertain' in the re-analysis 
was quite simply because there could not be said to exist enough information in the (co-)texts 
themselves in order to decisively determine their respective PS' prosodic values. Instead, what the 
prosodic re-analysis seems to point to is that a widening of analytical focus, contextualising a 
lexical item's typical prosodic value relative to its instantiative co-text, in most cases seem to result 
in prosodic uncertainty. 
Prosodic value Number of PS Epist. status Ref. type
EX  /  IN SP  /  NS
Very likely negative 7
Uncertain / Likely negative 1
Uncertain 3
Uncertain / Possibly inconspicuous 4  0  /  4  0  /  4
Table 17: Prosodic re-analysis of 15 of infant's core negative PS
 13 /  6 43  /  4
80  /  1 91  /  0
92  /  1 82  /  1
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If one chooses to see the initial analysis of semantic prosody in the PSA as type-focused, and
the prosodic re-analysis as token-focused, these results would have to be considered as being fairly 
within the bounds of what could be said to have been expected. Still, there are several implications 
of this inconsistency between the results of the PSA's initial sentence-scoped type-level prosodic 
analysis and the co-text-scoped token-level prosodic re-analysis that should be addressed: First of 
all, with regard to the PSA,
(1) if the results of the re-analysis are representative of what would be yielded from such a co-
text-scoped re-analysis of the entire material, the PSA's entire sentence-scoped analysis of 
semantic prosody would have to be considered as being fundamentally flawed, at least if one
considers the (affective) meaning of lexical items as being fundamentally context-
dependent.
(2) If the PSA's analysis of PS' semantic prosody is flawed, then the results of the entire PSA 
would consequently have to be considered as being compromised. This would, in turn, 
obviously seem a potential, or even likely, reason for (or at least contributing factor to) the 
inconclusiveness of the results of the PSA.
Second, with regard to some of the theoretical premises on which the PSA rests,
(3) if one accepts a context-dependent (i.e., relational) view of meaning as being true (as has 
been done in this thesis, see section 2.2.), then the central question would seem to be how 
affective meaning on the level of type relates to affective meaning on the level of token. For 
example, how does one determine the token-level affective meaning of a lexical item (i.e., 
when it is actually being used) which in itself (in isolation; on the level of type) clearly 
seems prosodically conspicuous, as is the case with, e.g. wonderful, awful, and beautiful? In 
other words, how does one quantify affective meaning?
This problematisation of the relation between the levels of type and token also seems to raise
serious doubts about the practicability of analysing only written text when studying affective 
meaning. That is, as already mentioned above, the basic reason why such a large number of PS were
judged prosodically uncertain in the prosodic re-analysis is simply that written text does not seem, 
at closer scrutiny, to communicate affective meaning with any reliable degree of transparency. 
Instead, there would seem to exist a need to consider contextual information outside the written 
53
text. Hence, since written text would seem generally insufficient for determining the prosodic value 
of a linguistic expression, at least with any certainty, and on the level of token, the question would 
seem to be what sort of information outside a written text that would be needed in order to be able 
to reliably assess a linguistic expression's affective meaning.
As already mentioned in section 2.3., expression of affective meaning is probably most 
commonly associated with non-lexical communicative features, such as tone of voice and facial 
gestures. According to Poyatos (1993), conventionalised communication, or language, needs to be 
understood as fundamentally being a triple-structure constituted by a communicative 
interdependency47 of [lexical items (and/or grammar)] and paralinguistic and kinesic features48. 
Non-lexical means of expression, such as tone of voice and facial gestures, are simply so 
communicatively ubiquitous that they must be understood as being intrinsic and constitutive to both
meaning and language. The morpho-syntactic arrangement (i.e., the instantiation of the lexicon – 
grammar continuum, see section 2.2.) would in itself quite simply be insufficient for 
communicating the affective content which ultimately, i.e., in every communicative instance, is 
what suffuses such arrangements with meaning (1993: 125)49. Simply put, according to Poyatos, 
that which is typically understood as language, would not be language, were it not for the non-
lexical means of affective expression which in effect discursively grounds lexical (linguistic) 
production, and these non-lexical means of  affective expression are paralinguistic and kinesic 
forms of expression.
There is indeed research showing that both paralinguistic and kinesic features do impact 
meaning: With regard to gestures, Cassell, McNeill & McCullough famously showed that when 
lexical content is accompanied by gestures language comprehension involves the integration of 
information conveyed via speech and gestures (1998: 20-21). Similarly, Nygaard & Lunders has 
presented data which seems to indicate that emotionally conspicuous tone of voice impacts the 
interpretation of words, and that it too is an integrated part of linguistic processing (2002: 591). In 
fact, Poyatos' framework would fit rather nicely with the notion of the perceived abstract meaning 
of a lexical item as corresponding to its expressional totality (or potential), as described in section 
2.2.. That is, the discrete meaning of (the sense of) a lexical item would quite simply be understood 
47 Cf. the idea of linguistic symbols as developing together with the perceptual symbols which they designate (see 
section 2.1.).
48 In brief, paralanguage can be said to correspond to the non-phonemic acoustic properties of language, and kinesics 
to conscious and unconscious gestures and body movements, both of which typically conveying attitudinal semantic
content (Poyatos 1993: 130-134).
49 Cruse (1986) says very much the same thing about what it actually is that, so to speak, gives meaning to meaning; 
“Every communicative utterance must transmit as part of its meaning an indication of intended propositional 
attitude. Without this, an utterance would be communicatively dead – it would resemble a proposition 'entertained' 
by a logician. The expression of propositional attitude has the effect of, as it were, energising a proposition” (274).
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as encompassing also the abstracted sum of paralinguistic and kinesic information associated with 
that lexical item's expression. Similar to how the lexical, or textual, context in which a lexical item 
is instantiated is taken to, as it were, rub off on that lexical item, so would the information of 
paralinguistic and kinesic features associated with that lexical item's instantiation also become part 
of its meaning.
Poyatos' framework does indeed seem to provide a viable way forward in attempting to 
study and understand affective meaning, and how its type- and token-level meanings relate to one 
another. What the (inconclusive) results of the PSA, together with the prosodic re-analyses of PS, 
most centrally seem to point to, is probably the need to more clearly define affective meaning. This 
would, then, likely be the equivalent of improving the understanding of how paralinguistic and 
kinesic information fit together with what is perceived as a lexical item's affective meaning on the 
level of both type and token.
6.Conclusion
Choosing to see the affective meaning of the sense of a lexical item as determined principally by 
how it is used (i.e., on the level of token), instead of inferring it from that sense's typical semantic 
prosody (i.e., type-level) would seem to point to the need to venture outside the written text and 
perhaps even the conventional understanding of what (human) language actually is. If one aims to 
better understand how affective meaning relates to grammar and language at large, it would 
certainly seem as if the sort of type-level analysis undertaken in this thesis would have to be 
considered defective. For this reason, the results suggesting correlative patterns between semantic 
prosody and epistemological status, and the indications of the lack of such patterns between 
semantic prosody and reference type, would have to be considered fundamentally compromised, or, 
at best, relevant only to an analysis of affective meaning on the level of type. Instead, what appears 
to be needed in order to successfully study and start comprehending the linguistic role of affective 
meaning would primarily seem to be defining the relationship outlined as the difference between 
affective meaning's type vs. token qualities, and how these relate to the meaning of lexical items.
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